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Cybersecurity was once a federal government responsibility because cyber had 
limited impact on state and local entities, but today’s cyber risks to critical infrastructure 
and public services affect all levels of government. This thesis explores the current state 
of cybersecurity in the United States and examines what role each level of government—
federal, state, and local—should play in protecting against and responding to a significant 
cyber incident. It evaluates current state and local cyber capabilities and outlines the 
capabilities these governments must develop to play a larger role in this growing 
homeland security mission. The research concludes that state and local governments 
should have an important role in cyber preparedness and cyber incident response, but 
many of these entities lack the capabilities necessary to play a meaningful role. 
Furthermore, current policies fail to provide clear jurisdictional boundaries between 
levels of government. Therefore, this thesis recommends that the nation develop a legal 
framework to improve jurisdictional boundaries, prioritize cyber investments at the state 
and local level, and improve cyber education. These steps will strengthen state 
sovereignty and improve the nation’s cyber posture. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
As technology matures and produces new opportunities for human advancement, 
it also creates new threats and vulnerabilities. Today’s interconnected and interdependent 
systems heighten these risks because they increase the likelihood of a cyber-attack having 
cascading consequences across the country. The federal government plays a large role in 
cyber preparedness and cyber incident response, but as the frequency and severity of 
cyber-attacks continue to grow, the nation must decide the proper balance between all 
levels of government in the cyber mission space. This thesis argues that the nation should 
address this escalating threat by embracing cyber federalism—a bottom-up approach 
where state and local governments play a larger role in cybersecurity. Cyber federalism 
would allow the federal government to focus resources on significant cyber threats, while 
empowering state and local governments to manage their own cybersecurity needs.  
The cyber threat has evolved from a localized problem impacting a small number 
of computers within isolated systems to a boundless danger for highly interconnected 
systems. This evolution forced the federal government to develop a range of policies 
aimed at improving cyber preparedness and cyber incident response. For example, 
Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) 41: United States Cyber Incident Coordination 
organizes the federal government’s cyber response efforts by clarifying the roles and 
responsibilities of all federal entities with a cyber mission. The federal government also 
utilizes several information sharing mechanisms—such as Information Sharing and 
Analysis Centers (ISAC), Information Sharing and Analysis Organizations (ISAO), and 
fusion centers—to improve collaboration with public and private sector partners. These 
policies and programs have helped the federal government improve their cyber 
capabilities, but the current cyber threat environment is too complex for the federal 
government to handle alone. 
In many instances, state and local governments are the first line of defense, 
especially if the cyber incident affects public services or critical infrastructure. 
Unfortunately, most state and local governments still struggle to develop the cyber 
capabilities required to prepare for and respond to these cyber threats. In 2013, the 
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Potomac Institute for Policy Studies developed the Cyber Readiness Index, which 
evaluates seven elements to gauge an entity’s cyber preparedness.1 These elements are: 
(1) strategy; (2) incident response; (3) cybercrime and law enforcement; (4) information 
sharing; (5) research and development, education, and capacity building; (6) commerce; 
and (7) defense.2 This thesis evaluates state and local cyber capabilities by examining 
their maturity in these seven categories and highlighting best practices from states that 
have found proficiency in these areas. 
This thesis also examines the legal constructs that shape the debate between 
federalism and a strong central government. For example, the Necessary and Proper 
Clause grants the federal government significant power to enact laws and the Supremacy 
Clause prevents states from enforcing any laws that conflict with federal statutes.3 
However, these constitutional provisions are counterbalanced by the 10th Amendment, 
which strengthens state sovereignty by granting states all powers to govern that are not 
reserved for the federal government.4 Together, these principles guide the jurisdictional 
balancing act among the various levels of government and provide a legal framework for 
each government’s underlying authorities. Tension over authority also exists in several 
homeland security missions, such as law enforcement and emergency services, because 
multiple levels of government play a role, but the nation has mitigated this strain by 
clarifying jurisdictional boundaries. Moving forward, state and local governments can 
learn from these examples as they examine their role in the cyber mission.  
Ultimately, this thesis concludes that the growing cyber threat is too complex and 
expansive for the federal government to handle alone so state and local governments 
must develop the cyber capabilities necessary to play a larger role. It recommends three 
courses of action to strengthen state and local cyber capabilities and to empower these 
1 Melissa Hathaway, Cyber Readiness Index 2.0, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, November 
2015, 4, http://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/cyber-readiness-index-2.0-
web-2016.pdf. 
2 Ibid. Also, note that the Cyber Readiness Index identifies “diplomacy and trade” as an element, but 
this has been renamed to “commerce” in this thesis as it more closely aligns with the responsibilities of 
state and local governments. 
3 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, and U.S. Const. art. VI, § 2. 
4 U.S. Const. amend. X. 
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governments in the cyber mission space. First, the nation should develop a legal 
framework to improve jurisdictional boundaries across all levels of government. Second, 
the nation should prioritize cyber investments at the state and local level. Third, state and 
local governments, in collaboration with the federal government, should improve cyber 
education at all grade levels. Overall, if the nation wants to maintain its reputation as a 
world leader in the cyber community and improve its cyber posture, it must embrace a 
bottom-up approach that gives state and local governments a more significant role in 
cybersecurity. Cyber federalism would make the nation more adaptable and dynamic 
when protecting against rapidly evolving cyber threats, which improves the security of 
the nation as a whole. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Our nation’s cybersecurity teeters on the edge of a precipice, struggling to 
maintain its footing as the ever-increasing barrage of cyber-attacks threatens safety and 
security. The number of cyber incidents continues to increase each year at an alarming 
rate, while the growing interconnectivity of digital devices improves the likelihood of 
significant cyber incidents and intensifies their consequences.1 A significant cyber 
incident could cripple the U.S. economy and infrastructure, leaving the nation vulnerable 
to significant loss of life and causing irreparable damage to essential life functions.2 This 
potential for catastrophic disaster forces the United States to focus enormous resources on 
building cybersecurity capabilities.3  
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
In 2013, President Obama unveiled Executive Order (EO) 13636: Improving 
Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, which called for a cybersecurity risk management 
framework and improved incentives for the adoption of cybersecurity best practices.4 
Three years later, President Obama released Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) 41: 
United States Cyber Incident Coordination, which describes how the federal 
government’s cyber entities coordinate cyber preparedness and incident response efforts.5
EO 13636 and PPD-41 are important steps but more work remains. 
1 James Clapper, “Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence 
Community,” Office of the Director of National Intelligence, February 9, 2016, 
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/SASC_Unclassified_2016_ATA_SFR_FINAL.pdf. 
2 Ibid. 
3 “Fact Sheet: Cybersecurity National Action Plan,” White House Archives, February 9, 2016, 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/09/fact-sheet-cybersecurity-national-
action-plan. 
4 Barack Obama, “Executive Order – Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity,” White House 
Archives, February 12, 2013, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/executive-
order-improving-critical-infrastructure-cybersecurity. 
5 Barack Obama, “Presidential Policy Directive – United States Cyber Incident Coordination,” White 
House Archives, July 26, 2016, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-
office/2016/07/26/presidential-policy-directive-united-states-cyber-incident. 
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Shortly after PPD-41 was released, government officials found evidence of 
malicious actors attempting to penetrate election ballot systems during the 2016 
presidential election.6 The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) responded by 
designating election infrastructure as critical infrastructure, thereby making it a protection 
priority within the “National Infrastructure Protection Plan” (NIPP).7 This allowed DHS 
to increase technical assistance to state and local election officials upon request, but many 
states saw this as an infringement on states’ rights and a step toward a federal takeover of 
the election process.8 The dispute underscored a disconnect between the states and the 
federal government on the proper level of involvement when state and local governments 
fall victim to cyber-attacks. 
Current cyber policies help clarify federal roles and responsibilities, but there are 
few policies addressing the proper role that each level of government—federal, state, and 
local—must play in the cybersecurity mission. Other homeland security missions, like 
law enforcement and emergency management, have clear roles and responsibilities for 
each level of government, but cyber’s jurisdictional boundaries are less clear. Therefore, 
using the principles outlined in PPD-41 and the standards set forth in physical response 
efforts, the nation can and should develop strategies and operational plans to maximize 
government capabilities and improve the security and resilience of our digital systems. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
What role should each level of government—federal, state, and local—play in 
protecting against and responding to a significant cyber incident? 
6 Scott Malone, “Russian Election Hacking ‘Wildly Successful’ in Creating Discord: Former U.S. 
Lawmaker,” Reuters, May 4, 2017, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-russia-
idUSKBN17Y2ON. 
7 Jeh Johnson, “Statement by Secretary Jeh Johnson on the Designation of Election Infrastructure as a 
Critical Infrastructure Subsector,” DHS, January 6, 2017, https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/01/06/statement-
secretary-johnson-designation-election-infrastructure-critical. 
8 Katie Bo Williams, “DHS Designates Election Systems as ‘Critical Infrastructure’,” The Hill, 




While the federal government continues to make progress in developing 
comprehensive cybersecurity policies, these strategies have not kept pace with 
advancements in technology, leaving the nation vulnerable to potentially catastrophic 
cyber-attacks. State and local governments are even further behind, thereby forcing them 
to rely heavily on the federal government for support in cybersecurity. This inefficient 
cycle exhausts resources and widens the capability gap; therefore, the nation needs a new 
strategy that enables state and local governments to develop their own capabilities, while 
also empowering them to utilize these capabilities. The evolving and expanding cyber 
threat landscape requires an all-of-nation approach to cybersecurity, which means state 
and local governments should take larger roles in protecting against and responding to 
cyber incidents.   
The objective of this thesis is to develop a strategy that clarifies jurisdictional 
boundaries between government entities before and during a cyber incident response. It 
takes a bottom-up approach, examining the current capabilities of state and local 
governments, and then recommends strategies to clarify responsibilities. It also 
underscores the importance of cyber federalism and provides a path forward as all levels 
of government search for their role in the cyber mission.  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
As technological risks continue to mature and increase in severity, there is also a 
growing body of literature exploring how the United States prepares for and responds to 
cyber incidents. These risks pose a serious threat to our national security so it is important 
to create a strategy that develops cyber capabilities and clarifies the roles and 
responsibilities for all levels of government. Ultimately, such a strategy must explore 
how federalism influences cyber response efforts.  
America has long debated the proper balance of authority between the federal 
government and the states. In fact, during the drafting of the Constitution several framers 
worried states would refuse to ratify the document for fear of sacrificing state 
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sovereignty.9 On one side of the debate was Thomas Jefferson, who believed that the 
states should maintain power or else Americans risked reliving the tyranny they fled in 
Europe.10 On the other side was Alexander Hamilton, who believed that a strong central 
government was critical to the continued development and success of a growing nation.11 
The remainder of this literature review assesses the Hamiltonian and Jeffersonian 
perspectives on federalism and examines this discussion from the homeland security 
viewpoint.  
1. The Hamiltonian Perspective 
Perhaps the greatest insight into the minds of the framers of the Constitution 
comes from “The Federalist Papers,” a series of articles drafted by Alexander Hamilton, 
James Madison, and John Jay, promoting the principles of the Constitution and 
encouraging its ratification.12 “The Federalist Papers” provided Hamilton with a platform 
to convince the public that a federal government was critical to the security and long-term 
viability of the newborn nation.13  
In Federalist Paper 9: The Union as a Safeguard against Domestic Faction and 
Insurrection, Hamilton addressed the public’s anti-federalist angst by explaining that the 
United States would be different than the English monarchy structure because the United 
States was a confederated system that focused on cooperation between states, not strong 
federal oversight.14 Essentially, he argued that the federal government was designed to 
protect the interests of each state, not undermine or override state governments.  
                                                 
9 “The Constitution,” White House: Our Government, accessed November 4, 2017, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/1600/constitution. 
10 Merrill D. Peterson, ed., A Summary View of the Rights of British America, Thomas Jefferson: 
Writings, New York: The Library of America, 1984, p. 118. 
11 James Madison, “Federalist Number 10,” Congressional Resources, 1787, 
https://www.congress.gov/resources/display/content/The+Federalist+Papers#TheFederalistPapers-10. 
12 “About the Federalist Papers,” Congressional Resources, accessed November 4, 2017, 
https://www.congress.gov/resources/display/content/About+the+Federalist+Papers. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Alexander Hamilton, “Federalist Number 9,” Congressional Resources, 1787, 
https://www.congress.gov/resources/display/content/The+Federalist+Papers#TheFederalistPapers-9. 
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In Federalist Paper 10: The Same Subject Continued: The Union as a Safeguard 
against Domestic Faction and Insurrection, Madison and Hamilton concurred with 
Scottish philosopher David Hume’s theory that large democracies are less vulnerable to 
tyranny from over-ambitious majorities because there are more checks and balances in 
place to protect the greater good.15 Hamilton reemphasized the value of checks and 
balances through a large democracy in Federalist Paper 67: The Executive Department, 
where he highlighted the rules that limit executive branch authority.16 He argued that the 
Constitution provided several checks and balances within the federal government to 
ensure that no one branch of government could seize control of the nation or maintain 
undue influence.17 
2. The Jeffersonian Perspective 
While Thomas Jefferson once described “The Federalist Papers” as the “best 
commentary on the principles of government which ever was written,” he did not 
necessarily agree with all of the arguments outlined in the 85 articles.18 In 1774, 
Jefferson penned A Summary View of the Rights of British America, which cautioned 
against an overzealous and unrestrained government because inadequate checks and 
balances led to tyranny.19 He understood the importance of a federal government, even 
serving as the third President of the United States, but remains one of the most important 
supporters of states’ rights in United States history.20   
Several of the Founding Fathers concurred with the Jeffersonian view on 
governing and disagreed with the beliefs outlined in “The Federalist Papers,” which led 
                                                 
15 Madison, “Federalist Number 10.” 
16 Alexander Hamilton, “Federalist Number 67,” Congressional Resources, 1787, 
https://www.congress.gov/resources/display/content/The+Federalist+Papers#TheFederalistPapers-67. 
17 Ibid. 
18 “Thomas Jefferson: Establishing a Federal Republic,” Library of Congress, accessed November 4, 
2017, https://www.loc.gov/exhibits/jefferson/jefffed.html. 
19 Peterson, A Summary View of the Rights of British America, p. 118. 
20 “Thomas Jefferson,” White House, accessed November 4, 2017, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/1600/presidents/thomasjefferson. 
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to a series of response papers known as “The Anti-Federalist Papers.”21 While these did 
not have the same lasting impact enjoyed by “The Federalist Papers,” they gave the 
countermovement a voice and reinforced the importance of states’ rights. For example, in 
Anti-Federalist Paper 45: Powers of National Government Dangerous to State 
Governments; New York as an Example, Robert Yates warned that the proposed 
Constitution made states subordinate to the federal government, “existing solely by its 
toleration, and possessing powers of which they may be deprived whenever the general 
government is disposed so to do.”22 He worried that the 10th Amendment, which asserts 
“the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to 
the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people,” did not provide 
adequate protection for state sovereignty.23 
However, Yates failed to account for other protections, such as the judicial 
branch, which allows savvy states to influence federal government policies even when 
they lack the legal authority to direct federal actions. In Arming States’ Rights: 
Federalism, Private Lawmakers, and the Battering Ram Strategy, Barak Orbach, 
Kathleen Callahan, and Lisa Lindemenn argue that states can influence federal policies 
by challenging them in court.24 Even when states do not win these cases, the mere 
challenge may put enough political pressure on the federal government to revise 
unpopular policies.25 The authors contend that “uncooperative federalism,” which is a 
“set of strategies that uses states’ regulatory powers to challenge the federal 
government,” allows states to exercise power over federal policymaking, even when 
armed with limited legal authority.26  
21 “Anti-Federalist Papers,” The Federalist Papers Project, accessed November 4, 2017, 
http://thefederalistpapers.org/anti-federalist-papers. 
22 Robert Yates, “Antifederalist Paper 45,” The Federalist Papers Project, accessed November 4, 2017, 
http://thefederalistpapers.org/antifederalist-paper-45. 
23 U.S. Const. amend. X. 
24 Barak Orbach, Kathleen S. Callahan, and Lisa M. Lindemenn, “Arming States’ Rights: Federalism, 
Private Lawmakers, and the Battering Ram Strategy,” Arizona Law Review, Vol 52, November 15, 2010, 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1696012. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. at 1163. 
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Overall, the spirited debates between the Hamiltonians and the Jeffersonians 
shaped today’s multilayered governing system that provides centralized leadership, while 
still providing mechanisms for the states to retain their sovereignty and assert their 
authority. As the country expanded in size and complexity, so did the scope of the 
federalism conversation; therefore, the next section focuses on the current literature that 
guides today’s dialogue, as it relates to the role of federalism in homeland security issues. 
3. Federalism and Homeland Security
Homeland security is no stranger to the federalism debate. When Congress 
created DHS in 2003, it was the largest reorganization of federal agencies with a 
homeland security focus since the National Security Act of 1947.27 As a result, it created 
new jurisdictional overlap within the federal government but also between federal entities 
and their state counterparts.28 In Federalism and Homeland Security: Our Constitutional 
System of Governance, Nadav Morag outlines the power struggle between public safety 
organizations from all levels of government.29 Morag argues, “The time-honored debate 
over federal vs. state and local power is very much alive in the homeland security realm,” 
and existing turf wars have expanded as the homeland security mission broadens.30 In 
other words, jurisdictional lines continue to blur as the homeland security mission 
evolves. 
Other scholars point out that the Hamilton versus Jefferson-style debate on the 
proper role of each level of government is further complicated in catastrophic events. For 
example, In Federalism, Law Enforcement, and the Supremacy Clause: The Strange Case 
of Ruby Ridge, Seth Waxman of the Georgetown University Law Center outlines the 
“anti-commandeering” principle, which prevents the federal government from demanding 
that state and local authorities assist in enforcing federal laws, even during an event of 
27 National Security Act, 50 U.S.C. 15 (1947) § 401. 
28 Nadav Morag, “Federalism and Homeland Security: Our Constitutional System of Governance,” 





national significance.31 The principle ensures the autonomy of the states, even during a 
crisis, but it is unclear if this principle would withstand the test of a national 
emergency.32 Specifically, Waxman notes that the Supreme Court created the “anti-
commandeering” principle before the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, and 
reasons that the public may have a higher tolerance for, or even expect, federal 
intervention in a post-9/11 era.33  
Conversely, in Reflections on Homeland Security and American Federalism, 
scholar Pietro S. Nivola argues that most homeland security issues are local and should 
be handled by local authorities.34 Like Jefferson, he concedes that the federal government 
plays an important role, but believes the federal government should focus its resources on 
inherently federal functions, like border security and preventing international terrorism.35 
Interestingly, Nivola does not mention whether he views cybersecurity as a state or 
federal issue.36 Similarly, in Learning from Disaster: The Role of Federalism and the 
Importance of Grassroots Response, authors James Carafano and Richard Weitz contend 
that “Homeland security and disaster management are national, not just federal, 
missions.”37 While the federal government can support responders by facilitating 
information sharing across jurisdictions and providing the resources required for an 
effective response, the states are best positioned to lead emergency response efforts.38 
                                                 
31 Seth P. Waxman, “Federalism, Law Enforcement, and the Supremacy Clause: The Strange Case of 
Ruby Ridge,” Georgetown Law Faculty Publications, March 2010, 
http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1279&context=facpub. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. at 153. 
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The literature also acknowledges that the transnational nature of cyber threats 
requires a coordinated effort from all levels of government. For example, in The Interplay 
of Borders, Turf, Cyberspace, and Jurisdiction: Issues Confronting U.S. Law 
Enforcement, Kristin M. Finklea argues that cybersecurity not only blurs jurisdictional 
boundaries in the United States, it also causes jurisdictional confusion on an international 
scale.39 As a result, the cyber threat is simply too tangled and complex for the federal 
government to handle alone.40 Instead, federal entities have used interagency agreements 
and memoranda of understandings to outline authorities on a case-by-case basis.41 This 
has led to improved information sharing and coordination, which minimizes the burden 
on state and local resources.42  
In State-Level Cybersecurity, Michael Glennon goes one step further by 
suggesting that states must take more responsibility in cybersecurity because the federal 
government and the international community have “largely dropped the ball.”43 Glennon 
asserts that the federal government has the technology to protect networks, sharing threat 
indicators, and mitigate the consequences of attacks, but the technology has not been 
implemented effectively; therefore, it is up to the states to take responsibility for their 
own security.44 He also argues that states should invest resources to become self-
sufficient in cybersecurity because these cyber defense capabilities can lead to long-term 
financial benefits.45 
Overall, the literature contends that as states and local governments continue to 
become more reliant on technology to provide public services and support their citizens, 
the need to protect these complex systems becomes increasingly a state and local issue. 
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While the federal government and state governments have clearly defined roles in law 
enforcement and emergency management efforts, cyber authorities are less clear; 
therefore, the nation must help states develop their cyber capabilities and improve the 
nation’s cybersecurity posture as a whole.  
4. Conclusion
In conclusion, there is a significant body of literature analyzing the proper role of 
the federal government in governing the nation, but neither side has found the perfect 
balance between levels of government in a democracy. Even visionaries like Alexander 
Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson could not predict the technological advancements of 
society and how these advancements alter the relationship between the federal 
government and the states. The remainder of this thesis explores this dynamic and 
evaluates the proper balance between the federal government and state governments in 
cybersecurity. Ultimately, it sides with the Jeffersonian perspective that state and local 
governments must play a larger role in cybersecurity. Therefore, the nation must 
empower states in the cyber mission space by clarifying jurisdictional boundaries and 
providing them with the resources necessary to develop and sustain their own cyber 
capabilities. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis focuses on policy considerations for cybersecurity in the public sector, 
but does not tackle the technical aspects of cybersecurity or critique tactics, techniques, 
or procedures used to combat cyber threats or gather information on cyber threats. 
Furthermore, while much of cybersecurity operates in a classified setting, the research in 
this thesis focuses solely on open-source materials and is meant for the widest possible 
distribution. It also focuses on public sector cybersecurity, not on the private sector. 
Information for this thesis comes from primary and secondary sources that cover 
federalism and national security issues—such as national preparedness, critical 
infrastructure protection, and cybersecurity. Primary sources include statutes, court 
decisions, testimony from legislative hearings, and unclassified documents from the 
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executive branch. These documents provide insight into current cyber incident response 
policies, including organizational roles and responsibilities.   
The secondary resources include newspaper articles, magazine articles, and books 
that discuss cybersecurity, cyber incident response, and related national security items. 
These documents provide an overview of the public discussion on cyber issues for 
government entities and highlight key opinions in this field. These sources also offer 
context to the primary sources and incorporate analysis on relevant policies in homeland 
security. 
This thesis employs a policy options analysis because current cyber incident 
response policies do not address jurisdictional conflicts in homeland security. The first 
step in this analysis process is to define the problem—that there is insufficient guidance 
on the division of labor between levels of government during a cyber incident. Therefore, 
this thesis examines existing federal cybersecurity policies, surveys state and local cyber 
policies, and identifies ways to bridge policy gaps between each level of government by 
articulating a framework for jurisdiction clarification. While there is no magic solution 
that prevents all cyber threats or perfects cyber incident response, a complete analysis 
provides solutions to improve cyber preparedness at the state and local level. 
The criteria for judging final recommendations is a jurisdiction’s ability to 
implement the policy within existing resource constraints and the likelihood the 
implemented policy will improve the nation’s ability to respond to a cyber incident. 
While the second measure can be broadly defined, for the purposes of this thesis, it will 
be measured by the likelihood state and local governments understand their role and their 
ability to fulfill their responsibilities. These recommendations must account for resource 
constraints, the disparities in capabilities between states and between jurisdictions within 
each state, and the potential consequences of implementation.  
The final output is a set of recommendations that outline a strategy for enhancing 
state and local government cyber capabilities and a jurisdictional framework that clarifies 
how government organizations utilize these capabilities during cyber incidents. The 
document aims to clarify jurisdictional ambiguities and strengthen capability gaps so 
12 
government entities are able to respond to incidents within their purview. This discussion 
will provide a foundation for policymakers to organize response efforts and maximize 
resources. This thesis begins by describing the evolution of cyber threats and outlining 
the federal cyber policies and programs. It then examines the current cyber capabilities of 
state and local governments, outlines how to define jurisdictional boundaries for each 
level of government, and recommends strategizes for how state and local governments 
can improve their capabilities to meet these target responsibilities. 
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II. EVOLUTION OF THE CYBER THREAT ENVIRONMENT
In the 1960s, computers were massive machines that cost millions of dollars, with 
minimal processing power and limited ability to communicate with other machines.46
This dynamic changed forever when International Business Machines (IBM) released the 
first mass-produced personal computer (PC) and the Department of Defense’s (DOD) 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) developed ARPANET, the precursor to the 
Internet.47 Together, the personal computer and the Internet unlocked limitless 
possibilities for the future of digital technology, but also dramatically increased system 
vulnerabilities. This chapter examines some of the most significant cyber incidents since 
the advent of the Internet, highlights trends in a rapidly evolving cyber threat 
environment, and explains how significant cyber incidents shape current national 
cybersecurity policies and programs. 
A. CYBER INCIDENTS DURING THE EARLY DAYS OF THE INTERNET 
In 1988, with the Internet still in its infancy, Robert Morris, Jr. developed the 
Morris worm, which was one of the first examples of widespread computer malware in 
history.48 A worm is software that travels from computer to computer on its own.49 This 
differs from a virus, which is software that travels from computer to computer with the 
assistance of an intermediary, such as a human user.50 Worms and viruses are both forms 
of malware, which is any software designed to gain unauthorized access to a computer 
and do harm.51 The Morris worm infected roughly 6,000 machines, or roughly 10 percent 
46 “Timeline of Computer History,” Computer History Museum, accessed November 4, 2017, 
http://www.computerhistory.org/timeline/1961/. 
47 “Birth of the Internet,” PBS, accessed November 4, 2017, 
http://www.pbs.org/transistor/background1/events/arpanet.html. 
48 “Cyber Timeline,” NATO Review Magazine, accessed November 4, 2017, 
http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2013/cyber/timeline/EN/index.htm. 





of the Internet users at the time.52 Morris was later the first person convicted under the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), which solidified the CFAA as a tool for 
protecting the integrity of digital systems.53  However, the cyber-attack was also a wake-
up call to the general public on the power of the Internet and demonstrated that the CFAA 
alone would not prevent further cyber incidents.  
Right before the turn of the century, in 1999, the Melissa virus became the first 
virus to use email for mass transmittal and became the fastest spreading virus of all 
time.54 The virus would access the infected user’s email contacts list and send an email 
with the virus to every single email address in that list.55 While the Melissa virus did not 
cause damage by deleting or stealing files, it did wreak havoc on the Internet by shutting 
down email systems for several days.56 A year later, the I Love You virus used the same 
method to infect roughly 45 million Windows PC users.57  
The damage caused by the Melissa virus and the I Love You virus highlighted the 
Internet’s rapid expansion and demonstrated the growing risks of the digital world. In 
1988, the United States government panicked when the Morris worm infected roughly 
6,000 users, but 11 years later malware was capable of infecting over 7,000 times as 
many users in days. The next section illustrates how these early malware infections were 
only the beginning. As technology matured in the 21st century, malicious actors continued 
to develop their cyber capabilities and found new ways to use these skills to attack assets 
throughout the world. 
52 Cara Giaimo, “In 1988, One Rogue Worm Shut Down 10 Percent of the Internet,” Atlas Obscura, 
November 3, 2015, http://www.atlasobscura.com/articles/in-1988-one-rogue-worm-shut-down-10-percent-
of-the-internet. 
53 “Headliners: Accessing Jail?” New York Times, January 28, 1990, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1990/01/28/weekinreview/headliners-accessing-jail.html. 
54 Elinor Mills, “Melissa Virus Turns 10,” CNET, March 31, 2009, 
https://www.cnet.com/news/melissa-virus-turns-10/. 
55 David Kleinbard and Richard Richtmyer, “U.S. Catches ‘Love’ Virus,” May 5, 2000, 
http://money.cnn.com/2000/05/05/technology/loveyou/. 
56 “IDFAQ: What was the Melissa Virus and what can We Learn from it?” SANS Institute, accessed 
November 4, 2017, https://www.sans.org/security-resources/idfaq/what-was-the-melissa-virus-and-what-
can-we-learn-from-it/5/3. 
57 Mark Ward, “A Decade on from the ILOVEYOU Bug,” BBC, May 4, 2010, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/10095957. 
15 
B. CYBER-ATTACKS ON PRIVATE SECTOR ASSETS 
While hackers were able to cause chaos and gain notoriety in the 20th century, by 
the early stages of the 21st century malicious actors were able to monetize their 
infiltrations by stealing treasure troves of data from large international corporations.58 For 
example, from 2003 to 2004 the TJX Companies Incorporated—which owns well-known 
discount stores like TJ Maxx and Marshalls—was victimized by a group of hackers that 
uncovered vulnerabilities in the company’s wireless credit card services and data storage 
systems.59 The perpetrators stole data from roughly 45.7 million customers, causing over 
$250 million in damage.60 It also set the stage for other large-scale cyber-attacks to mega 
corporations, such as the Heartland Payment Systems (2008), Epsilon (2011), and Target 
(2013).61 
Some prominent cyber-attacks on the private sector are state-sponsored initiatives 
designed to gather information through cyberespionage. For example, in 2010, Google 
announced that it was a victim of a highly sophisticated and targeted attack by hackers 
with ties to the Chinese government.62 The attack, coined Operation Aurora, aimed to 
monitor Chinese human rights activists by penetrating their computer systems through 
their Google email accounts.63 While Google was able to mitigate the damage of this 
attack by acting quickly and publicizing China’s malfeasance, China and other nation-
state actors continue to find new ways to breach private sector systems for invaluable 
customer data. This trend is likely to continue as companies improve their ability to track 
58 Evan Schuman, The TJX Data Loss and Security Breach Case, University of Sydney: Engineering 
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61 Mary Helen Miller, “Data Theft: Top 5 Most Expensive Data Breaches,” The Christian Science 
Monitor, May 4, 2011, http://www.csmonitor.com/Business/2011/0504/Data-theft-Top-5-most-expensive-
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62 David Drummond, “New Approach to China,” Google Official Blog, January 12, 2010, 
https://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/01/new-approach-to-china.html. 
63 Ariana Eunjung Cha and Ellen Nakashima, “Google China Cyberattack Part of a Vast Espionage 
Campaign, Experts Say,” Washington Post, January 14, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/01/13/AR2010011300359.html. 
16 
consumer habits and predict consumer behavior because nation-states can use the same 
information to spy on large populations.  
The 2013 and 2014 data breaches of Yahoo’s user account data are also examples 
of large-scale attacks by a nation-state.64 Experts believe the Russian government 
orchestrated two large-scale cyber-attacks on Yahoo to collect user account data and 
acquire access to user records and emails.65 Yahoo estimates that the malicious actors 
stole data on three-billion users, but the true costs remain unclear as it is impossible to 
know how these hackers used this data and what other systems they breached through the 
sensitive information they collected.66 
As Russian hackers were infiltrating Yahoo’s massive databases, North Korean 
forces penetrated Sony Pictures’ systems, stole employees’ personally identifiable 
information (PII) and emails, and posted this information on the Internet.67 The incident 
embarrassed the company and left employees’ private information vulnerable to mass 
distribution.68 It also provided a glimpse of North Korea’s growing cyber capabilities and 
illustrated their willingness to use these capabilities. The next section highlights key 
examples of nation-states moving beyond these private sector targets, instead aiming at 
critical government functions in other countries.  
C. CYBER-ATTACKS ON NATIONAL ASSETS 
While many of the most notable cyber-attacks had private sector targets, some of 
the most devastating and costly cyber incidents involve state-sponsored attacks on 
64 “Law Enforcement Says Yahoo Account Hacks were Likely Sponsored by Foreign Government,” 
CBS News, December 15, 2016, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/yahoo-hack-law-enforcement-believes-
state-actor-us-official-says/. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Elizabeth Weise, “Yahoo Says 2013 Hack Hit All 3 Billion User Accounts, Triple Initial 
Estimates,” USA Today, October 3, 2017, https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2017/10/03/3-billion-
yahoo-users-breached-company-says/729155001/. 
67 Gabriel Sanchez, Case Study: Critical Controls that Sony Should Have Implemented, SANS 




government systems.69 In 2010, Iran discovered that a complex computer worm, known 
as Stuxnet, had infected the supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system 
and programmable logic controllers in their nuclear research computer systems.70 The 
worm utilized four zero-day security exploits, which are unknown vulnerabilities in 
software or hardware.71 These vulnerabilities have no patch because developers do not 
know they exist and it can sometimes takes days, months, or years for developers or 
system administrators to discover and patch these weaknesses.72 Stuxnet was in Iran’s 
nuclear systems for years, slowly altering the spin of the system’s centrifuges, which 
caused them to spin out of control and destroy themselves.73 The attack set Iran’s nuclear 
program back several years and is widely described as “the world’s first digital 
weapon.”74 While no one took credit for Stuxnet, experts believe the United States and 
Israel developed the worm and used an employee within the Iranian nuclear program to 
upload the worm to Iran’s computer systems.75  
Any discussion of state-sponsored cyber operations must include two of the most 
active countries in cyberespionage and cyber warfare, Russia and China.76 One example 
of Chinese-sponsored cyberespionage is the 2015 cyber-attacks of the United States’ 
Office of Personnel Management (OPM). According to the United States, the Chinese 
69 Tavish Vaidya, 2001-2013: Survey and Analysis of Major Cyberattacks, Georgetown University, 
September 1, 2015, https://arxiv.org/pdf/1507.06673.pdf. 
70 David Kushner, “The Real Story of Stuxnet,” IEEE Spectrum, February 26, 2013, 
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71 Ryan Naraine, “Stuxnet Attackers Used 4 Windows Zero-day Exploits,” ZD Net, September 14, 
2010, http://www.zdnet.com/article/stuxnet-attackers-used-4-windows-zero-day-exploits/. 
72 “What is a Zero-Day Exploit,” Fire Eye, accessed November 4, 2017, 
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military penetrated OPM systems and stole the PII of over 20 million federal 
employees.77 While some hackers penetrate systems for specific information or to disrupt 
certain elements within a system, China is well known for casting a wide web during 
cyber intrusions, hoping to acquire any and all available data.78 Therefore, many experts 
believe China supported the attack to gather information on federal employees and 
develop a massive database they could later use to identify and recruit American spies 
within the federal government.79 
On the other hand, Russia is known for using their impressive cyber capabilities 
on specific targets.80 As Michael Schmidt and David Sanger of the New York Times 
stated in early 2015, “While Chinese hacking groups are known for sweeping up vast 
amounts of commercial and design information, the best Russian hackers tend to hide 
their tracks better and focus on specific, often political targets.”81 Later that year, Russia 
demonstrated this targeted approach during a territorial dispute with Ukraine.82 Here, 
Russian hackers penetrated and disabled Ukraine’s power grid, knocking six Ukrainian 
power companies offline.83 While certainly not the first example of cyber warfare, it was 
the first time a country aimed a cyber-attack directly at a civilian population.84 The attack 
was a significant escalation in the ever-evolving world of cyber warfare and set the stage 
for future Russian cyber operations. A year later, Ukraine again blamed Russia for a 
77 Brian Naylor, “One Year After OPM Data Breach, What has Government Learned,” NPR, June 6, 
2016, http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2016/06/06/480968999/one-year-after-opm-data-
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Officials Say,” New York Times, April 25, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/26/us/russian-hackers-
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cyber-attack on Kiev’s power grid.85 Earlier this year Ukraine accused Russian hackers 
of a third series of attacks, this time disrupting their power grid, financial system and 
critical infrastructure systems.86 The attacks demonstrate a willingness for world powers 
to expand their targets from federal government facilities and systems, like nuclear 
programs and employee personnel databases, to critical infrastructure that services the 
civilian population.  
D. CYBER-ATTACKS ON STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT ASSETS 
While a cyber arms race is certainly an alarming trend for world leaders, another 
growing movement that should worry policymakers is organized cyber-attacks on state 
and local governments.87 Malicious actors have a variety of motives for penetrating state 
and local information systems, but one of the most prevalent motives in recent incidents 
is data theft. For example, since 2014, the Oregon Employment Department and the state 
of Louisiana have both fell victim to data theft, which resulted in over one-million user 
profiles being compromised and released on the Dark Web.88 These files included PII, 
such as social security numbers and addresses, which could be used to steal victims’ 
identities or exploit key government officials.89 
Another common objective in recent cyber-attacks on state and local governments 
is hacktivism, which is a politically motivated attack on information system, designed to 
obstruct normal computer activity.90 These attacks can come in various forms and from 
numerous malicious actors, but many of the most notable incidents were orchestrated by 
a decentralized hacktivism group known as Anonymous. For example, following the 
85 Pavel Polityuk, “Ukraine Investigates Suspected Cyber Attack on Kiev Power Grid,” Reuters, 
December 20, 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-cyber-attacks-idUSKBN1491ZF. 
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officer-involved shooting of teenager Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, Anonymous 
orchestrated a multifaceted cyber-attack on the Saint Louis County Police Department 
and Ferguson city hall.91 The hacktivists stole police personnel records and coordinated 
distributed denial of service (DDOS) attacks on city systems, which affected system 
operations for several city offices.92 
Similarly, in 2015, Baltimore police arrested Freddie Gray for allegedly 
possessing an illegal switchblade.93 Gray died from significant spinal injuries while in 
police custody, which sparked protests across the nation and motivated a group affiliated 
with Anonymous to initiate “Operation Baltimore,” a series of cyber-attacks that knocked 
the city’s website offline for over 16 hours.94 Baltimore was unprepared for the cyber-
attacks and struggled to keep online services running during the incident, but eventually 
returned to operation with assistance from the federal government.95 In 2016, 
Anonymous continued to attack state and local information systems following the Flint, 
Michigan, water crisis and the passage of a controversial bill restricting the rights of 
transgender individuals in North Carolina.96 These incidents highlighted the growing 
trend of hacktivism aimed at state and local governments, as well as a disturbing lack of 
91 Dara Kerr, “Ferguson, Mo., Police Site Hit with DDoS Attack,” CNET, August 14, 2014, 
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92 Ibid. 
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Colin Wood, “Unmasking Hacktivism and Other High-Profile Cyberattacks,” Gov Tech, August 28, 
2015, http://www.govtech.com/public-safety/Unmasking-Hacktivism.html. 
21 
cyber preparedness by these government offices.97 In each case, they were overwhelmed 
by the attacks and struggled to maintain online operations during the incidents.98   
Moreover, not all cyber incidents originate from a computer. In 2013, heavily 
armed and highly trained gunmen attacked Pacific Gas and Electric Company's Metcalf 
Transmission Substation in California, cutting fiber-optic phone lines and firing more 
than 100 rounds into the radiators of 17 transformers.99 The attack briefly disabled the 
region’s telecommunication systems, including their 9-1-1 emergency system, and 
resulted in $15 million in damage.100 One government official called the attack, “the 
most significant incident of domestic terrorism involving the grid that has ever 
occurred.”101 It was a powerful example of a physical attack causing significant cyber 
consequences.102  
Overall, cyber incidents have evolved significantly since the Morris worm and the 
Melissa virus. While early cyber incidents could be inconvenient and unsettling, 
consequences were limited because systems were isolated and independent. As society 
progresses and technology evolves, the severity of these incidents continue to rise 
because information systems are increasingly interconnected and interdependent. Today’s 
significant cyber incidents may have serious impacts on critical infrastructure systems, 
such as the power grid, or neutralize advanced nuclear programs, such as Stuxnet. 
Therefore, all levels of government must understand these threats and develop the cyber 
capabilities required to mitigate consequences and ensure continuity of operations. The 
next section examines the federal government’s cyber preparedness policies and 
programs, which frame national cyber incident response efforts and support state and 
local cyber activities.   
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E. FEDERAL PREPAREDNESS POLICIES 
The foundation of national preparedness centers on the Post-Katrina Emergency 
Management Reform Act of 2006 (PKEMRA), which created the National Preparedness 
System.103 The National Preparedness System is a systematic process for developing the 
capabilities necessary to achieve the “National Preparedness Goal” of “a secure and 
resilient nation with the capabilities required across the whole community to prevent, 
protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from the threats and hazards that pose 
the greatest risk.”104 This system creates a structure for identifying threats, examining the 
capabilities required to manage these threats, and pinpointing methods to measure the 
maturity of these capabilities. 
Federal readiness policies also build on PPD 8: National Preparedness, which 
outlines the actions required to build and sustain the preparedness capabilities described 
in the “National Preparedness Goal.”105 PPD-8 requires DHS to maintain a series of plans 
organizing and aligning strategies “across the five mission areas: prevention, protection, 
mitigation, response, and recovery.”106 These plans, known as the “National Planning 
Frameworks” and the “Federal Interagency Operational Plans,” are critical to the 
implementation of the National Preparedness System because they provide structure to a 
complex initiative that requires coordination from the whole community.107 This 
structure allows everyone from a large federal agency to a small town to understand their 
role in enhancing national preparedness.108  
103 “National Preparedness System,” FEMA, November 2011, https://www.fema.gov/media-library-
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Another critical element of the National Preparedness System is the “National 
Incident Management System” (NIMS), which outlines a consistent approach to 
facilitating coordination between all levels of government during an incident.109 It is 
modeled after the “National Interagency Incident Management System” (NIIMS), which 
was designed by firefighters to manage large-scale wildfires in California and Arizona, 
but its incident response principles extend to the digital world as well.110 Today, NIMS is 
an essential tool for managing incidents with multiple agencies and is used throughout 
the country for large-scale incidents.111 The federal government requires departments and 
agencies to adhere to NIMS principles, including when coordinating cyber incident 
response activities.112 
F. FEDERAL CYBERSECURITY AND CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
POLICIES 
In 2013, the White House released PPD-21: Critical Infrastructure Security and 
Resilience, which aims to strengthen the federal government’s relationship with private 
sector partners by improving information sharing processes and mechanisms.113 PPD-21 
focuses on the public-private partnership because the federal government believes 
homeland security is a shared responsibility, especially since a large majority of critical 
infrastructure is privately owned.114 This partnership is further described in the NIPP, a 
national plan to synchronize infrastructure protection efforts, and implemented by Sector-
Specific Agencies (SSA), which are the federal departments and agencies tasked with 
109 “National Incident Management System,” FEMA, December 2008, 
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leading federal coordination within their critical infrastructure sector.115 The NIPP also 
explains how critical infrastructure owners and operators can incorporate cybersecurity 
strategies into their protection efforts to ensure secure and resilience systems, especially 
as interdependencies continue to increase within critical infrastructure systems.116 
On the same day President Barack Obama released PPD-21, he also signed EO 
13636: Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, which requires federal agencies 
to work with public and private partners to identify cyber risk management best practices 
and improve cyber threat information sharing.117 The directive also ensures that the DHS 
Chief Privacy Officer and the DHS Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties assess 
privacy and civil liberties risks created by the functions outlined in EO 13636.118 EO 
13636 plays a pivotal role in cybersecurity policy because it highlights the 
interdependencies of cybersecurity and critical infrastructure, while also demonstrating 
the growing importance of prioritizing cybersecurity as a national security threat.119 
EO 13636 also required the National Institute for Standards and Technology 
(NIST) to develop a cyber risk management guide, which led to the “Framework for 
Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity” (Cybersecurity Framework).120 The 
Cybersecurity Framework provides “a prioritized, flexible, repeatable, performance-
based, and cost-effective approach, including information security measures and controls, 
to help owners and operators of critical infrastructure identify, assess, and manage cyber 
risk.”121 The document is scalable to organizations of all sizes, providing standards, 
115 “National Infrastructure Protection Plan 2013: Partnering for Critical Infrastructure Security and 
Resilience,” DHS, accessed November 4, 2017, 
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guidelines, and best practices that can improve the organization’s cybersecurity posture 
regardless of the industry.122 
In 2015, the White House took another step towards improving federal 
cybersecurity efforts by releasing EO 13691: Promoting Private Sector Cybersecurity 
Information Sharing, which aimed to improve cyber information sharing across all levels 
of government and the private sector.123 EO 13691 created Information Sharing and 
Analysis Organizations (ISAO) to facilitate the flow of information within the private 
sector and between the public and private sector.124 ISAOs are modeled after Information 
Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISAC), which are information hubs used by the critical 
infrastructure community to improve communications between owners and operators.125
ISAOs are meant to supplement, not supplant, existing information sharing mechanism, 
such as ISACs, critical infrastructure coordinating councils, fusion centers and InfraGard, 
while focusing specifically on cyber intelligence.126 
One year later, the Obama administration released their final cybersecurity 
directive, PPD-41: United States Cyber Incident Coordination, which explains how each 
federal department and agency with a cyber nexus coordinates their cyber incident 
response efforts.127 PPD-41 also clarifies roles and responsibilities for each federal cyber 
operations center and describes how the three lead organizations for cyber—DHS, the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence (ODNI)—coordinate during a cyber incident.128 The directive is an 
122 “Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity,” page 13. 
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important step in formalizing the roles of each cyber entity in the federal government, 
which minimizes confusion during an incident and clarifies the responsibilities of each 
entity in the cyber mission space.129 
PPD-41 also required an update to the “National Cyber Incident Response Plan” 
(NCIRP), which details how the public and private sectors can develop the capabilities 
required to prepare for and respond to a significant cyber incident.130 The NCIRP is a 
scalable and flexible document so its principles can be applied across all levels of 
government and in the private sector.131 A transparent federal government cyber response 
plan provides state and local governments with the information necessary to build their 
own plans because all levels of government understand what to expect from federal cyber 
incident response efforts.132 Furthermore, the NCIRP is the connective tissue for physical 
and cyber preparedness as it formalizes the alignment between PPD-41 and the National 
Preparedness System.133  
Soon after President Donald Trump took office, he issued EO 13800: 
Strengthening the Cybersecurity of Federal Networks and Critical Infrastructure, which 
calls on federal departments and agencies to conduct risk assessments of their 
information systems and identify ways to improve their current digital infrastructure.134
The order also requires federal departments and agencies to align their cybersecurity 
protocols to NIST’s “Cybersecurity Framework.”135 Finally, EO 13800 directs the 
federal government to work with the private sector to improve the cybersecurity of 
critical infrastructures, such as bridges and power grids.136  
129 Ibid. 
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G. POLICY IMPLEMENTATION 
Together, PPD-8, PPD-21, and PPD-41, along with EO 13636, EO 13691, and EO 
13800 provide a comprehensive framework for how the federal government protects 
against and responds to cyber incidents. These documents are the foundation for national 
cyber strategies because they describe how the federal government plans to develop, 
sustain, and utilize capabilities, while also offering guidance for state and local 
governments on how to develop their cyber preparedness policies and strategies.   
Two key mechanisms for developing, implementing, and evaluating preparedness 
capabilities are the “National Preparedness Report” (NPR) and the Homeland Security 
Preparedness Grant (HSPG) program. The NPR is an annual report organized by the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) that evaluates the preparedness efforts 
of all levels of government, using more than 450 data sources from various public and 
private sector organization, including 66 non-federal organizations.137 It measures current 
capabilities against predetermined targets to identify capability gaps and highlight areas 
for improvement.138 The NPR has identified cybersecurity as the most significant 
capability gap every year since it was first published in 2012, despite jurisdictions 
acknowledging cybersecurity as their greatest security concern.139  
The HSPG program is also a critical element of the National Preparedness System 
and PPD-8 because it is a tool for addressing state and local government capability gaps 
identified in the NPR.140 In 2016, FEMA allocated over $1.6 billion to state and local 
governments through these programs and another $729 million through other non-disaster 
relief grants.141 While these grants provide state and local governments with the funding 
necessary to address critical capability gaps, states have discretion on how to allocate the 
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funds within their jurisdiction and the continued lag in cybersecurity capability 
development suggests current allocation strategies are not working.  
There are also several important programs and functions that are critical to 
implementing cybersecurity and critical infrastructure protection policies, especially for 
information sharing. A key structure the federal government utilizes to gather and 
disseminate information is a fusion center.142 DHS describes a fusion center as, “A 
collaborative effort of two or more agencies that provide resources, expertise and 
information to the center with the goal of maximizing their ability to detect, prevent, 
investigate, and respond to criminal and terrorist activity.”143 Fusion centers serve as an 
information hub between federal agencies and state and local government entities, which 
allows all participants to gather, analyze, and share information across all levels of 
government in real-time.144  
Critical infrastructure coordination mechanisms—such as coordinating councils, 
ISACs, and ISAOs—are also important information sharing structures because they serve 
as information nerve centers between all levels of government and the private sector.145
The critical infrastructure community utilizes coordinating councils to enhance the 
public-private partnership within a sector and across sectors by promoting open and 
continuous dialogue.146 This not only improves situational awareness during steady state, 
but also improves the community’s ability to respond during an event.147 ISACs and 
ISAOs offer many of the same information sharing benefits as fusion centers and 
coordinating councils but they are unique because they offer around-the-clock operation 
142 “Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers,” Department of Justice – 
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centers to private sector partners.148 These operation centers provide situational 
awareness for critical infrastructure owners and operators and, when necessary, offer 
threat warning and incident reporting capabilities.149 ISAOs differ from ISACs because 
they do not organize through the critical infrastructure sectors, which is useful to entities 
with cybersecurity interests that do not fit neatly within any of the 16 critical 
infrastructure sectors.150 
H. CONCLUSION 
Overall, the federal government has developed a wide range of policies and 
programs to protect the nation against the evolving cyber threat landscape. While the 
various frameworks described in this chapter have not eliminated cyber risks, these 
efforts have improved the nation’s ability to protect against and respond to significant 
cyber incidents. However, today’s cyber threat environment is too interconnected and 
complex for the federal government to tackle alone. The job of protecting cyber assets 
must involve government at all levels. The next chapter outlines state and local 
government initiatives aimed at protecting key systems and infrastructure across the 
country, while also highlighting important gaps state and local governments must address 
to improve their cyber posture.   
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III. OVERVIEW OF STATE AND LOCAL CYBER CAPABILITIES
As the scope and severity of cyber threats continues to grow, the role of state and 
local governments in addressing these threats becomes increasingly important. 
Cybersecurity was once a problem reserved for the federal government and the private 
sector, but today state and local governments are the first line of defense, especially if the 
cyber incident affects public services or critical infrastructure.151 State and local 
governments have tackled this challenge with varying degrees of success; therefore, this 
chapter examines how to build state and local government cyber capabilities to ensure 
they all have the tools to address this growing threat. 
The first section of this chapter outlines the three most significant barriers state 
and local governments face when attempting to develop cyber capabilities: understanding 
the threat, allocating sufficient resources to address the threat, and developing a 
workforce capable of protecting against and responding to the threat. The second section 
describes current policies and programs state and local governments develop to overcome 
these barriers, including governments that have found success and governments that still 
struggle to overcome these obstacles. The third section identifies best practices and 
outlines a desired end-state for states as they continue developing their cyber strategies. 
A. BARRIERS TO CYBER CAPABILITY BUILDING 
While state and local governments understand the importance of cybersecurity, 
many still have difficulty developing the capabilities necessary to address this expanding 
threat. The NPR, which evaluates the capabilities of all 50 states based on self-
assessments, has ranked cybersecurity as the most significant capability gap for five 
straight years despite states ranking cybersecurity as one of their highest priorities.152 In 
other words, states recognize the need to develop their cyber capabilities, but still 
struggle to improve their proficiency in cybersecurity.  
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1. Understanding the Threats and Vulnerabilities
One factor that limits some state and local governments from strengthening their 
cybersecurity is their difficulties understanding the full range of threats and 
vulnerabilities.153 The threat itself is undeniable. One Pennsylvania official claims that 
malicious actors attempted to breach the state’s information systems over 90 billion times 
in 2016.154 Even if only a small fraction of these attempts had the potential to cause 
harm, that is still an alarming number.    
Today, technology is deeply woven into the fabric of nearly all public services as 
everything from public transportation to public health relies on digital systems to operate. 
This interconnectivity improves efficiency, but also creates new security weaknesses. For 
example, in 2016, malicious actors infected the San Francisco Municipal Railway 
ticketing system with ransomware, disrupting commuters and temporarily forcing 
officials to run transportation services for free as technical support addressed the security 
breach.155 As the monetization of cyber-attacks increases and the popularity of 
ransomware grows, state and local governments should expect more of these attacks on 
their information systems.  
State and local governments also store large amounts of data on their citizens and 
employees—such as voter registration information, birth certificates, and tax filings—
which makes them susceptible to data theft if not properly protected. For example, in 
2013, Washington’s state court database was hacked, resulting in over 160,000 people’s 
social security number and driver’s license information being compromised.156 The 
following year, malicious actors gained access to over one-million health records stored 
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on a Montana Department of Public Health and Human Services database.157 State and 
local governments are being attacked on a daily basis, which makes every government 
information system vulnerable to a data breach and make state and local cyber 
capabilities even more important.158 
Additionally, a push to modernize state and local voting systems has left these 
governments vulnerable to voter fraud and election tampering, which threatens to 
undermine a key pillar in any democracy.159 Assistant Secretary Jeanette Manfra of 
DHS’s Office of Cybersecurity and Communications testified before Congress that 21 
states had breaches to their election information systems during the 2016 presidential 
election.160 Furthermore, 30 states used digital ballots that cannot be audited or verified 
by an independent monitor.161 While the United States intelligence community concluded 
that the cyber-attacks did not impact the election’s results, malicious actors may be able 
to manipulate future elections if state and local governments are unable to strengthen 
their defenses and secure their systems.162 
As if the current threat environment were not challenging enough, cyber risks will 
only increase as emerging technologies become more commonplace in society, which 
will further strain security resources and increase the need for comprehensive 
cybersecurity policies. For example, many municipalities across the country are 
researching new technology that would move them closer to the smart city model.163 The 
Department of Transportation defines smart cities as automated and integrated 
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transportation systems that use data, applications, and technology to improve the 
movement of people within a city.164 In 2014, New York City kicked off a smart city 
initiative to create a more responsive government by integrating information and 
communication technology through enhanced data collection of city assets and improved 
real-time information sharing.165 This integration could greatly strengthen the efficiency 
and effectiveness of public services, but would also introduce new cyber risks, which 
allow failures in one system to have cascading impacts to other systems.166  
Similarly, the automotive industry is making significant progress in autonomous 
vehicle technology, which will revolutionize transportation for millions of Americans, 
but also create new cybersecurity risks. Ford and General Motors have each invested over 
one-billion dollars in artificial intelligence research, while technology companies like 
Google are also investing heavily in autonomous technology.167 Furthermore, Uber is 
already test driving autonomous vehicles on public roads in Arizona, California, and 
Pennsylvania.168 This technology is improving rapidly, but with these advancements 
comes new cybersecurity risks because it introduces new cyber vulnerabilities for 
malicious actors to exploit. Therefore, state and local governments must be prepared to 
develop strategies and policies that mitigate these risks ensure safety on their roads. 
2. Inadequate Funding
Another obstacle limiting state and local governments from improving their cyber 
capabilities is difficulty securing sufficient resources to address capability gaps.169 A 
2016 study from the National Association of State Chief Information Officers (NASCIO) 
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surveyed each state’s Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) about the levels of 
progress in their state’s cybersecurity.170 Only 10 CISOs said that cybersecurity is more 
than two percent of their information technology budget and only 12 states have at least 
15 full-time employees working on cybersecurity.171 Furthermore, 80 percent of these 
CISOs believe they lack the funds necessary to provide appropriate security to the 
information systems in their jurisdiction.172  
One reason CISOs struggle to secure cybersecurity funding is that it is difficult to 
articulate the threat and why elected officials should prioritize cybersecurity costs 
alongside or above other public safety concerns, such as law enforcement or emergency 
services. State and local cybersecurity professionals struggle to maintain metrics that 
demonstrate effectiveness and convince decision-makers to reallocate resources. While 
some states, like New Mexico and Colorado, have robust cybersecurity plans that rely on 
data, other states do not provide clear measurements for success or risks.173 This makes it 
more difficult to convince state leaders of the dangers associated with threats they may 
not understand or fully appreciate.  
The result of this struggle is a “confidence gap” between elected officials and 
state cybersecurity leaders.174 Roughly 66 percent of elected officials at the state level 
say they are very confident that their state has adequate cybersecurity policies and 
capabilities, while only 27 percent of state CISOs have this level of confidence.175 These 
numbers suggest that subject matter experts have not been successful in teaching 
decision-makers about the scope and severity of the cyber threats their jurisdictions face.  
Public officials are likely to continue prioritizing traditional services, like 
emergency services or road repair, because they understand these problems and 
170 Ibid. at 1. 
171 Ibid. at 8. 
172 Ibid. at 7. 
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appreciate their funding requirements. These traditional services also provide tangible 
results that allow taxpayers to see their tax dollars at work. For example, if a municipality 
repairs a pothole drivers see the road improvement, but most drivers do not think about 
the resources used to prevent malicious actors from breaching traffic light systems to 
cause harm. In general, voters do not assess politicians on their cybersecurity views 
unless the jurisdiction has been victimized by a security breach, thus politicians are not 
pressured to focus on these issues. Without proper metrics and education, state leaders 
will continue to deprioritize cybersecurity and focus resources elsewhere. 
3. Workforce Gaps
A third barrier to improving cybersecurity at the state and local level is a lack of 
qualified candidates to fill information technology positions.176 In 2015, the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics estimated there were more than 209,000 cybersecurity jobs in the United 
States.177 Stanford University suggests that this number could grow 53 percent by the end 
of 2018.178 Other experts believe the number of information security jobs could multiple 
tenfold by 2025.179 This sharp upturn in demand will only increase the number of 
unfilled cybersecurity jobs, which will exceed 1.5 million across the world by 2020.180
As the talent gap widens, competition for skilled cyber professionals will increase, which 
means state and local governments will only fall further behind if they do not develop 
strategies to overcome this barrier. Therefore, state and local governments should craft 
strategies to develop a pool of talented cybersecurity professionals able to fill the 
growing demand in the public and private sector. 
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B. CURRENT STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT CYBER 
CAPABILITIES 
As with many homeland security missions, state and local governments have 
varying levels of sophistication in cybersecurity. Some states have invested significant 
resources to build cyber capabilities and expand their state’s footprint in the cybersecurity 
mission space, while other states are still working to build a foundation for future 
development. Since developing cyber capabilities is an inexact science, it is difficult to 
measure this divide. However, in 2013 the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies developed 
the Cyber Readiness Index, which is one of the first comprehensive studies examining the 
cyber capabilities of 125 countries across the world.181 This section uses their framework 
and tailors it to the state and local level to provide a common standard for analyzing the 
development of cyber capabilities in key areas. 
The Cyber Readiness Index evaluates seven elements: (1) strategy; (2) incident 
response; (3) cybercrime and law enforcement; (4) information sharing; (5) research and 
development, education, and capacity building; (6) commerce; and (7) defense.182 These 
elements, while not exhaustive, are the pillars of a strong cyber foundation because they 
balance short and long-term needs. This positions jurisdictions for future growth, while 
still empowering them to address current cybersecurity concerns. The remainder of this 
section explores how state and local governments can enhance their capabilities in each 
of these categories. 
1. Strategy
One critical component to short and long-term success in any homeland security 
mission is a well-developed strategy because it clarifies leadership objectives and 
outlines the path to achieve these objectives. A strategic plan allows state and local 
governments to prioritize operations and predict resource requirements, thereby 
181 Melissa Hathaway, Cyber Readiness Index 2.0, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, November 
2015, page 4, http://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/cyber-readiness-index-2.0-
web-2016.pdf. 
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stabilizing the budgetary process and minimizing inefficiencies.183 Additionally, research 
from NASCIO suggests that states with formal cybersecurity strategies tend to receive 
more funding because they can articulate a clear plan to legislators.184  
As chairman of the National Governors Association (NGA), Virginia Governor 
Terry McAuliffe has worked to improve coordination between states as they develop and 
refine their cyber strategies.185 The NGA, in collaboration with subject matter experts 
across the country, provide governors with “resources, tools and recommendations to 
help craft and implement effective state cybersecurity policies and practices.”186 The 
association is also working with relevant stakeholders to create working groups that can 
offer guidance for state and local leaders to use when formulating their own cyber policy 
frameworks and plans.187 Furthermore, the NGA issues recommended courses of action, 
such as Act and Adjust: A Call to Action for Governors for Cybersecurity, to facilitate the 
strategic planning process.188 
Some states have been successful incorporating these recommendations into their 
strategies. For example, Texas developed the 2016-2020 State Strategic Plan for 
Information Resources Management, which outlines five strategic goals for ensuring the 
reliability and security of current public services, while also outlining paths for future 
innovation and workforce development.189 Additionally, New Mexico developed a suite 
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of strategic plans, which are part of a long-term initiative to improve cyber capabilities in 
the public sector and private sector.190 Overall, states with comprehensive cyber 
strategies are well-positioned to improve their cyber capabilities because they have a 
clear plan for the future. These strategies also provide a roadmap for resource allocation, 
which increases the likelihood of funding because decision makers understand what 
resources are necessary to facilitate growth and development.  
2. Incident Response
Even the most secure information systems are vulnerable to a cyber-attack, which 
means that state and local governments must have adequate incident response capabilities 
to stop the attack and restore operations. This requires an incident response plan that 
identifies roles and responsibilities, as well as equipment and trained personnel to ensure 
that response efforts are organized and coordinated.191 Cyber incident response varies 
greatly from state to state, with some states using a multi-agency approach and others 
centralizing all responding entities into one unit.192 Other states have not formalized any 
cyber incident response strategy.193 Each state must decide which approach best 
addresses their needs, while also understanding that a unity of effort allows states to 
maximize resources when addressing this growing threat.   
One example of a state that uses a multi-agency approach to cyber incident 
response is Virginia.194 During an incident, Virginia stands up a Unified Command 
Structure with three lead agencies—the Information Technologies Agency (ITA), the 
Department of Emergency Management, and the State Police—working together to 
manage the cyber and physical consequences of an incident.195 The ITA is the lead 
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authority on cyber response, while emergency managers and law enforcement handle the 
physical response.196 
On the other hand, Michigan takes a very different approach to cyber incident 
response through its Cyber Disruption Response Team (CDRT), which coordinates state 
response efforts to a cyber incident or disruption.197 Like Virginia, the CDRT includes 
key leaders from emergency management, law enforcement and information technology, 
but instead of bringing multiple agencies together during an incident Michigan builds and 
trains interagency teams before an event so the teams can coordinate in advance.198 This 
was successful during the Flint water crisis when hacktivists attempted to infiltrate the 
state’s networks because the CDRT responded quickly and prevented any significant 
disruption of services.199 As a result, this innovative approach to cyber incident response, 
while resource intensive, has become a model for other jurisdictions and the foundation 
for NASCIO’s cyber incident planning guides.  
States are also establishing teams of cyber reservists that are prepared to support 
primary incident response teams if an incident overwhelms existing resources. These 
support services can come from traditional reservist pools, like the National Guard, but 
some state and local governments are exploring civilian cyber emergency teams similar 
to the volunteer firefighter model.200 For example, Michigan created a Civilian Cyber 
Corps team, which is a group of trained cyber volunteers that provide emergency 
assistance when the governor declares a state of emergency.201 While there is not enough 
evidence to determine whether these teams are capable of providing adequate support 
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during an emergency, the program is an example of innovative solutions to the 
cybersecurity problem.    
States have different approaches to managing cyber risks so the NGA surveyed 
each state’s cyber incident response plan to categorize commonalities and identify best 
practices.202 The NGA recognized that each state has different needs, but argued that all 
strong response plans have five essential elements: (1) clearly articulated authorities; (2) 
well-defined organizations, roles, and processes; (3) risk assessments; (4) coordination 
mechanisms across all relevant organizations; and (5) well-exercised response and 
recovery operations.203 These elements provide states with the information necessary to 
prepare for and respond to cyber incidents, while also accounting for the unique 
requirements and limitations of each jurisdiction.   
3. Cybercrimes and Law Enforcement
The third element to consider when evaluating a state and local government’s 
cyber capabilities is their legal authorities to prevent, investigate, and prosecute 
cybercrime. While industry experts and scholars define cybercrime differently, for the 
purposes of this thesis cybercrime is defined as “any crime that is committed using a 
computer or network, or hardware device.”204 This may include data theft, fraud, 
copyright infringement, or any other illegal act that is executed through information 
systems.205 In 2015, cybercrimes cost victims roughly $500 billion globally and that 
number is expected to rise to over two trillion dollars by 2019.206 Therefore, cybercrime 
is a serious concern to all levels of government throughout the world, one that will only 
grow as cybercriminals become more sophisticated and economies become more 
interconnected with the digital world. 
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The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) limits the federal government’s 
authority to prosecute cybercrimes unless there is a “compelling federal interest,” which 
is “where computers of the federal government or certain financial institutions are 
involved or where the crime itself is interstate in nature.”207 Therefore, in many cases it is 
incumbent upon state and local governments to have the expertise to investigate and 
prosecute cybercriminals. This responsibility is particularly challenging for police forces 
with resource limitations, inadequate cyber training, and inexperienced personnel.208 As 
a result, several states are taking steps to reallocate resources to address this growing 
problem.  
Some states, such as Massachusetts, have drafted cybercrime strategies to 
organize state and local law enforcement agencies responding to and investigating these 
incidents.209 Other states have created new law enforcement agencies to handle these 
cases, which centralizes cybercrime responsibilities. For example, California—with a 
booming technology industry that is spearheaded by world renowned technology 
companies in Silicon Valley—created the California Cyber Crime Center to maximize 
law enforcement resources, enhance digital evidence capabilities, and promote 
innovation.210 Other states have taken a similar approach with task forces, complaint 
centers, and other centralized programs designed to improve cybercrime investigations 
and maximize resources. 
Overall, state and local governments must understand that cybercrime is a 
growing problem that requires a unique set of skills to prevent, investigate, and prosecute 
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so traditional law enforcement models will not suffice.211 Many state and local 
governments are developing specialized teams or organizations to handle these complex 
cases, which is a step in the right direction but requires significant resources and training. 
Therefore, states must examine their laws and resources to ensure that these cybercrime 
operations have the tools necessary to manage these cases and punish cyber criminals. 
4. Information Sharing
Information sharing is a critical component of all homeland security missions, but 
it is particularly important to cybersecurity because of the interconnectivity of systems 
and the agility of the cyber environment. Many information systems are also 
interdependent, which further amplifies the need for timely and actionable information 
sharing because most technology relies on the security of other systems for its own 
operability. Therefore, it is important that state and local government have mechanisms to 
share information with other government entities, as well as nongovernmental entities 
with cybersecurity interests.  
There are several information sharing mechanisms for states to utilize—such as 
the federally sponsored ISACs, ISAOs, and fusion centers described in Chapter II and 
state-funded cyber centers—so each state must determine which tools, or groups of tools, 
meet their needs. For example, one information sharing service may focus on critical 
infrastructure vulnerabilities while another organization focuses solely on cyber threats in 
the financial sector. Therefore, states may need to gather information from multiple 
sources, which also means state and local governments must have the ability to 
understand how to manage these resources and use the information they receive to 
improve decision-making. 
Some states have created their own cyber information sharing and operation 
centers to ensure the flow of timely and actionable information to public and private 
sector entities in their jurisdiction. For example, New Jersey created the New Jersey 
Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Cell (NJCCIC), to “promote shared and 
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real-time awareness of cyber threats to New Jersey’s citizens, local governments, 
businesses, and critical infrastructure owners and operators.”212 The NJCCIC allows the 
state to promote cyber awareness, share information, file cyber incident reports, and 
analyze cyber threats.213 While the information and analysis hub is still new, senior 
leaders in New Jersey’s Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness believe the 
organization has given their agency the tools to address cyber threats in an organized and 
comprehensive fashion.214 Other states, like Indiana, are following suit with their own 
operation centers to improve their cyber preparedness and cyber incident response 
efforts.215 
Overall, cyber’s interconnected and global nature requires collaboration. There 
are many information sharing mechanisms for state and local governments, but 
governments need to understand how to maximize these resources and use this 
information to improve the cyber posture of all public and private sector entities in their 
jurisdiction. States that are successful sharing cyber information have developed 
strategies to take advantage of existing options and organize the information they receive 
into useful intelligence for their citizens. 
5. Research and Development, Education, and Capacity Building
State and local governments must focus on the present but still have an eye on the 
future. The best way for governments to improve their cybersecurity future is to invest in 
cyber research and development, education and capacity building. These forward-
thinking initiatives facilitate innovation and build the workforce required to meet the 
needs of a growing mission space. Some states, like California, have innovation ingrained 
in their culture, which allows them to lean on universities and the private sector to help 
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develop a cyber workforce.216 However, other states do not have this luxury and need to 
take a more proactive approach to ensure that their jurisdiction offers an environment that 
cultivates innovation in technology. 
Many state and local governments incentivize cyber education by offering 
scholarships to students pursuing cyber degrees or by providing grants to schools looking 
to research and develop new technology.217 For example, Virginia recently developed a 
Cybersecurity Public Service Scholarship Program that awards one-million dollars in 
scholarships to Virginia students who study cybersecurity and work in the public sector 
after they graduate.218 Virginia also offers technical training to military veterans 
searching for a post-military career in cybersecurity.219 These programs eliminate the 
financial barriers to cyber education and improve the cyber skills of the current and future 
workforce. 
Several states have also introduced cyber ranges, which are virtual reality 
environments where students can simulate cyber-attacks and practice defending their 
systems from malicious actors.220 Cyber ranges provide current and future cyber 
professionals with an opportunity to grow and develop their skills in a controlled but 
well-resourced facility.221 These facilities also allow public and private sector 
organizations to train employees, try new software before purchasing, and test their 
network defenses in a safe environment that does not put real world systems at risk.222  
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These programs alone will not bridge the cyber talent gap, but they are important 
steps that each jurisdiction can to take to improve the technical skills of the next 
generation’s workforce. States like Virginia and California have found success in training 
and developing their cyber workforce by offering an assortment of research and 
education options, which provides current and future cybersecurity professionals with 
opportunities to hone their skills. As a whole, all states should strive to develop their 
workforce by providing a range of options to research, learn, and train in the 
cybersecurity field. 
6. Commerce
While technology saddles state and local governments with new security burdens, 
it also provides these jurisdictions with unlimited potential for economic growth. Cyber 
can alter existing industries, as demonstrated by technology’s impact on the automotive 
industry with electric cars, or create new industries, such as the virtual reality or artificial 
intelligence industries.223 These advancements create new possibilities for local 
economies if local markets understand how to maximize new opportunities.  
State and local governments have been racing to earn a stronghold in various 
technology industries, knowing that these industries are powerful job creators for cities 
across the world.224 For example, Maryland is one of many states to offer appealing pro-
business incentives, including tax credits and seed money for startup technology 
companies, to lure companies to the region and increase the state’s profile in the 
technology community.225 On the other hand, Detroit is luring top cyber professionals to 
their city with lower costs of living and remodeled business centers in the hopes that 
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technology companies will follow the talent.226 Overall, the technology industry has 
demonstrated consistent growth throughout the 21st century, which means more jobs and 
a stronger economy for state and local governments that succeed in this market.227
Therefore, technology should not only be a high priority for security purposes, but also a 
key component of strategies for long-term job growth and a stable economy. 
7. Defense
The final element of cyber preparedness is cyber defense because a state or local 
government’s ability to protect itself from malicious actors is critical to their 
cybersecurity posture. The public relies on state and local governments to work with 
critical infrastructure owners and operators to protect critical systems in their jurisdiction, 
which means these entities must be able to provide support so these systems continue to 
operate. Furthermore, governments continue to put public services online, which leaves 
them vulnerable to cyber-attacks and increases the need to maintain a strong defensive 
cyber posture.  
While no cyber defense is impenetrable, state and local governments must be able 
to minimize cyber risks, increase resilience, and ensure the integrity and reliability of 
essential information systems.228 As a result, cyber defense relies on the maturity of all 
other elements outlined in the Cyber Readiness Index. These governments must have 
comprehensive strategies that lead a coordinated effort to protect information systems 
and prevent cyber-attacks. Additionally, they must have a skilled workforce that is well-
trained, well-informed, and equipped with the latest security products and tools, while 
also being able to respond quickly when a malicious actor does penetrate lines of defense. 
Overall, a strong cyber defense is the result of a commitment to developing all elements 
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of cyber preparedness so governments need to enhance all of their cyber capabilities if 
they want strong cybersecurity. 
C. STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT BEST PRACTICES 
The time has come for state and local governments to focus on building their own 
cybersecurity and cyber response capabilities. State and local governments have been 
victimized by everything from ransomware attacks on critical infrastructure to 
widespread cyber-attacks on voting systems, which illustrates the need to improve their 
cyber aptitude.229 Fortunately, several states have found success building cyber 
capabilities, which provides best practices for other state and local governments. States 
like Virginia, Maryland, Michigan, and California have set the bar for cyber preparedness 
at the state level and while each state has taken a unique approach, there are three trends 
other states should incorporate into their cyber capability building plans. These best 
practices include: (1) crafting comprehensive cyber strategies; (2) developing 
organizations that allow the state to implement these strategies; (3) and providing these 
organizations with the tools necessary to achieve their mission.   
The states with the most advanced cyber capabilities have crafted comprehensive 
cyber strategies aimed at strengthening each of the seven elements outlined in the Cyber 
Readiness Index. A comprehensive cyber strategy is a critical first step for building cyber 
capabilities because it provides a blueprint for success by identifying short and long-term 
goals, as well as a path for achieving these goals. This allows states to develop policies 
and plans that help implement their strategies. Each state should develop a strategy that 
addresses their cyber risks, but also identifies opportunities for social and economic 
growth. 
States have also found success in developing their cyber capabilities by 
developing organizations or programs that centralize functions and focus on maximizing 
resources and personnel. For example, California has redefined how law enforcement 
prosecutes cybercrimes by creating an organization dedicated to these specialized, and 
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often complex, crimes. The California Cyber Crime Center centralizes cybercrime 
reporting and improves collaboration by allowing all law enforcement officers with 
cybercrime portfolios to share resources.230 This also allows California to offer advanced 
training in one location and provide state-of-the-art technology, such as digital forensics, 
that helps law enforcement as they investigate these crimes.231 Many states run cyber 
operation centers that track cyber threat indicators and share information with partners in 
the public and private sector, which improves the state’s ability to protect against and 
respond to cyber threats.  
A comprehensive cyber strategy and an efficient cyber workforce are critical 
elements to building cyber capabilities, but these concepts only work if states provide the 
workforce with the tools they need to accomplish their mission. These tools should 
include state-of-the-art facilities and equipment that allow cyber professionals to keep 
pace with evolving technology, as well as training so the workforce has the skills 
necessary to combat a seemingly endless number of cyber threats. In the end, a workforce 
is only as strong as the tools it has to work with so states should ensure that their cyber 
professions are equipped to handle these complex threats. 
As a whole, the most prepared states have comprehensive cyber strategies and the 
resources necessary to implement these strategies. These resources allow states to address 
cybersecurity issues without relying on the federal government or the private sector to 
assist, which empowers them to control their own destiny in an evolving digital world. If 
states follow these best practices and focus on building the seven capabilities identified in 
the Cyber Readiness Index, they will be well-positioned to handle future challenges and 
prosper from a growing industry.    
D. CONCLUSION 
As the first line of defense in many cyber incidents, particularly cyber incidents 
affecting public services and critical infrastructure, state and local governments must 
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have the capabilities necessary to protect against and respond to cyber-attacks. Currently, 
understanding the threat, inadequate funding, and workforce gaps are the obstacles that 
limit states from improving these capabilities, but these impediments can be overcome. In 
fact, some states are making significant progress in the cyber mission space and are well-
positioned to meet the cybersecurity challenges of evolving technology, such as 
driverless vehicles and smart cities. Other states should follow their lead and prioritize 
cybersecurity as a top security issue. 
Moving forward, the desired end-state for each state and local government should 
be to develop enough cyber capabilities to handle most cyber incidents without any 
interruption to government services, much like law enforcement and emergency services 
are able to handle most incidents without requiring assistance from the FBI or FEMA. 
States should also be able to protect their critical infrastructure from cyber-attacks and 
have the technical skills to assist private sector owners and operators when their systems 
are attacked. Chapter IV outlines the legal framework for this approach to cybersecurity 
and examines how other homeland security missions employ federalism principles to 
empower state and local governments. 
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IV. BUILDING A FRAMEWORK FOR JURISDICTIONAL
BOUNDARIES IN CYBER 
Since the American Revolution, U.S. leaders have been at odds over the proper 
balance of state sovereignty and a strong central government. While Article I of the 
Articles of Confederation created a centralized government, Article II ensured “each state 
retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and 
right, which is not… expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress 
assembled.”232 These conflicting messages left uncertainty over the roles of the states 
and the federal government, which remained a lingering ambiguity when the Constitution 
replaced the Articles of Confederation.  
While several provisions within the Constitution expanded the federal 
government’s power, other sections of the Constitution continued to protect states’ rights. 
For example, the Necessary and Proper Clause in Article I, which authorizes Congress to 
“make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper,” provides the legislative branch 
significant power to enact laws it believes serve the best interests of the country.233
Additionally, the Supremacy Clause in Article VI declares federal laws “the supreme 
Law of the Land,” which prevents states from enforcing any laws that conflict with 
federal statutes.234  
On the other hand, the Constitution also ensures that states retain authority to 
govern their citizens. The strongest protection of state sovereignty stems from the 10th 
Amendment: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.”235 
This amendment empowers states by providing them the authority to enact the laws and 
policies that best meet the needs of their constituents. 
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Together, these principles guide the jurisdictional balancing act among the 
various levels of government in the United States and provide a legal framework for each 
government’s underlying authorities. The remainder of this chapter examines this ageless 
conflict and its impacts on cybersecurity by outlining current jurisdictional considerations 
for cyber and surveying other homeland security mission spaces for best practices.   
A. LEGAL FRAMEWORKS 
Federalism is the principle that authority to govern should be dispersed across 
multiple levels of government and not be vested in a single governing body.236 Justice 
Anthony Kennedy once argued that federalism is the framers’ brilliant strategy for 
preventing authoritarian rule while allowing the country to reap the social and economic 
benefits of unified governance.237 He stated, 
Federalism was our Nation's own discovery. The Framers split the atom of 
sovereignty. It was the genius of their idea that our citizens would have 
two political capacities, one state and one federal, each protected from 
incursion by the other. The resulting Constitution created a legal system 
unprecedented in form and design, establishing two orders of government, 
each with its own direct relationship, its own privity, its own set of mutual 
rights and obligations to the people who sustain it and are governed by 
it.238 
Essentially, federalism was a unique experiment designed to protect against tyranny by 
providing authority to multiple layers of government, which also created endless 
ambiguity. 
Several landmark cases have shaped the balance of power between federal and 
state governments. For example, in Ware v. Hylton, the Supreme Court held a Virginia 
statute that allowed the state to confiscate debt payments to English creditors was 
unconstitutional because it undermined a treaty between the United States and England, 
thereby violating the Supremacy Clause.239 While the Constitution grants states the right 
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to enact and enforce their own laws, the Court determined the federal government would 
triumph when state actions conflicted with federal laws and treaties. The holding of this 
case later became known as the preemption doctrine.240 
The Supremacy Clause is critical to current cyber policies because it gives the 
federal government significant authority to enact cyber legislation and influence cyber 
policies across the country. It also impacts the ability of state and local governments to 
develop their own cybersecurity laws because these statutes must adhere to federal rules. 
For example, each state has its own laws concerning electronic communications but 
changes to federal laws on electronic communication, such as the Communications 
Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA), may invalidate these state statutes.241 
Therefore, the Supremacy Clause puts states in a precarious position because they risk 
allocating significant resources to developing and implementing comprehensive cyber 
policies, only to later have these policies undermined by contradictory federal policies.  
The federal government also retains authority to control the flow of money 
between states through the Commerce Clause, which affirms that Congress has the power 
“to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the 
Indian Tribes.”242 For example, in one of the most influential Commerce Clause cases in 
United States history, Gibbons v. Ogden, a New York statute allowed the state to lease 
exclusive rights to trade in its waters, which conflicted with federal interstate trade 
regulations.243 The Supreme Court again ruled in favor of the federal government, 
determining that the Commerce Clause prevented states from enacting laws that 
conflicted with federal interstate commerce legislation.244 This decision solidified the 
federal government’s broad authority to control the flow of commerce across the country. 
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The emergence of e-commerce will play a significant role in how markets are 
regulated in the future. In 2016, e-commerce accounted for over 40 percent of all retail 
sales growth.245 During that year, over 224 million customers purchased items online, 
and the National Retail Federation expects online retail to grow between eight to 12 
percent in 2017, which means total online sales will exceed $400 billion.246 However, e-
commerce is also blurring state lines and international borders because people can buy 
products from anywhere in world with the click of a button. As online banking and e-
commerce become more prevalent, the security of these systems becomes more important 
so understanding which government has the authority to oversee these markets is critical. 
While states traditionally have authority to regulate commerce within their borders, the 
rise of e-commerce may strengthen the federal government’s authority to regulate 
commerce because the interconnectivity of e-commerce increases the likelihood of a 
cyber incident in one state affecting citizens of another state. This dynamic may impact 
the traditional balance of power between the federal government and the states; therefore, 
it is important for all levels of government to find the proper balance to ensure that there 
are strong cybersecurity policies in place to support this growing industry.  
While the Supremacy Clause and the Commerce Clause provide the federal 
government certain enumerated powers in jurisdictional disputes, the federal government 
also has implied powers created by the Necessary and Proper Clause. In Federalist Paper 
44: Restrictions on the Authority of the Several States, James Madison notes that the 
Necessary and Proper Clause was the most controversial provision in the Constitution but 
a critical element because the clause gives the Constitution the flexibility required for 
longevity.247 He reasoned that no document could ever account for all current conditions 
245 “U.S. Census Bureau News,” Department of Commerce, May 16, 2017, 
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or predict all future issues; therefore, the Necessary and Proper Clause affords the federal 
government the ability to address problems as they arise.248
The Supreme Court’s decision in McCulloch v. Maryland demonstrates the vast 
powers bestowed on the federal government by the Necessary and Proper Clause.249 
Here, the state of Maryland aimed to impede the operations of a federal bank within its 
jurisdiction by taxing all notes associated with the bank, but the federal government 
refused to pay.250 The Court sided with the federal government, arguing that the 
Constitution grants the federal government certain implied powers through the Necessary 
and Proper Clause, including the power to create a national bank, and states cannot enact 
laws that impede these implied powers.251 
Aside from the creation of federal banks, one of the most significant examples of 
the federal government asserting authority through the Necessary and Proper Clause is 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal initiative.252 The New Deal was a series of 
programs aimed at guiding the United States through the Great Depression by increasing 
federal assistance programs and expanding the role of the federal government in 
governmental functions.253 Roosevelt used the Necessary and Proper Clause as the legal 
basis for his ambitious programs, reasoning that he needed to implement these programs 
to save a crumbling economy and ensure the nation’s welfare.254 The New Deal brought 
fundamental and dramatic changes to the U.S. intergovernmental system because it 
introduced the widespread use of federal grant programs to influence state actions.255 
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Roosevelt required states to initiate certain programs or enact certain legislation to 
receive federal grants, which expanded the federal government’s authority but also gave 
states additional resources to develop programs and provide services within their 
borders.256 
As the New Deal demonstrated, the Necessary and Proper Clause gives the 
federal government wide discretion to implement federal programs if it is in the best 
interest of national security and public welfare. Therefore, as the nation becomes 
increasingly reliant on technology, cybersecurity becomes more important to public 
welfare, and the federal government’s authority to organize cybersecurity programs 
strengthens. This principle also provides the federal government the authority to 
influence how state and local governments organize and operate their cyber 
operations―if these state and local governments accept cybersecurity grant funding. 
Therefore, the Necessary and Proper Clause may be the federal government’s most 
powerful Constitutional tool for implementing cybersecurity policies while proving legal 
justification for granting funds to states in need of federal support.    
On the other end of the spectrum, the 10th Amendment provides states significant 
authority to develop their own policies and enact their own laws. In fact, in Federalist 
Paper 45: The Alleged Danger From the Powers of the Union to the State Governments 
Considered, Madison proclaims, “The powers reserved to the several states will extend to 
all objects, which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties and 
prosperities of the people, and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the 
state.”257 Therefore, while the enumerated and implied powers give the federal 
government tremendous power, the states have their own powers to influence policy. 
One landmark decision that demonstrates how the 10th Amendment protects 
states sovereignty is New York v. United States.258 In this case, a federal statute, known 
as the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act, required states to develop 
256 Ibid. at 156. 
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comprehensive waste disposal plans and forced states to take ownership of the waste if 
private companies did not comply with these plans.259 New York enacted its own waste 
disposal legislation, which did not include the “take title” provision, and sued to stop the 
federal government from undermining state policies.260 The Supreme Court held that the 
federal government could not “commandeer” the state legislative process, thereby 
protecting New York’s right to create and enforce its own laws.261  
Later cases continued to magnify the 10th Amendment’s power in protecting state 
sovereignty and limiting federal overreach. For example, in Printz v. United States, the 
Brady Act required state and local law enforcement officers to run background checks on 
prospective handgun purchasers.262 The Supreme Court held that requiring states to 
enforce federal law impeded on state sovereignty.263 The Court reached a similar verdict 
in Shelby County v. Holder, when several states challenged a provision in the Voting 
Rights Act that required select southern states to obtain federal approval before making 
changes to their voting laws.264 Chief Justice John Roberts concluded that the provision 
violated the principle of “equal sovereignty” and the states’ ability to pursue their own 
legislative objectives.265 
Overall, the Constitution grants the federal government broad authority to create 
and enforce federal laws, but the 10th Amendment also provides the states significant 
power to govern within their borders. While there are limitations to a state’s authority to 
develop, implement, and enforce cyber laws and policies, the 10th Amendment gives 
states wide discretion to manage the mission space as they see fit. As a result, the federal 
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whereby each governing body aims to stay within its constitutional limits while still 
providing services to its constituents.  
B. FEDERALISM IN OTHER HOMELAND SECURITY MISSIONS 
The jurisdictional balancing act is common to homeland security because all 
levels of government play an important role. Long before Congress created the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2003, many of the nation’s most important 
homeland security functions were performed by police officers, firefighters, and other 
first-responders. After DHS was created, the lines of power blurred, but state and local 
authorities remained a critical cog in the security machine. This section focuses on the 
role of federalism in three missions—counterterrorism, immigration enforcement, and 
emergency management—to determine what lessons cyber professionals can learn about 
balancing the homeland security interests of all levels of government. 
1. Counterterrorism
Terrorism is a complex threat that requires coordination and information sharing 
across all levels of government but also creates friction and confusion when law 
enforcement agencies respond to the same incident or conduct overlapping investigations. 
While the mission space relies heavily on the basic principles of the Supremacy Clause 
and the 10th Amendment, there are statutes and policies that define the appropriate lanes 
for each level of government. Article III, Section 1, of the Constitution states, “The 
judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such 
inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”266 In 1789, 
Congress used this authority to establish a federal court system by enacting “An Act to 
Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States,” also known as the Judiciary Act.267 
The Judiciary Act gave federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over federal law 
violations.268 However, as the nation grew federal prosecutorial resources thinned so 
266 U.S. Const. art. III, § 1. 




Congress gave states concurrent jurisdiction, thereby allowing them to try criminal cases 
that violated both state and federal law.269
Today, Title 18 of the United States Criminal Code specifies that “the district 
courts of the United States shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the 
States, of all offenses against the laws of the United States”; however, it also notes that 
this authority does not impair state courts’ jurisdiction of criminal cases.270 This statute 
formalizes the concurrent jurisdiction structure whereby, in certain circumstances, federal 
courts and state courts can each prosecute criminals for the same crime. As a result, 
concurrent jurisdiction empowers states to create and enforce their own laws, thereby 
strengthening state sovereignty, but it also increases the need for coordination between 
levels of government to ensure the efficient use of resources. 
The United States Criminal Code also creates certain rules for determining which 
level of government has the authority to prosecute the most serious crimes, such as 
terrorism. The federal government has exclusive jurisdiction to prosecute a terrorist act if 
the act “transcends national boundaries.”271 However, states have exclusive jurisdiction if 
the act is considered domestic terrorism under state law and has no foreign nexus.272
Other terrorism crimes, such as the use of weapons of mass destruction, provide federal 
and state governments with concurrent jurisdiction.273 If both levels of government have 
jurisdiction, the FBI works with relevant state and local law enforcement agencies to 
investigate and prosecute the crime. This collaboration takes place in many forms but the 
FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) and fusion centers often play an important 
role.274  
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The complexities of overlapping authorities illustrates the importance of clear 
jurisdictional boundaries across all levels of government. Cyber policymakers can learn 
from law enforcement by pushing for laws and policies that outline roles and 
responsibilities in the cyber mission space. While PPD-41 outlines responsibilities for 
each federal agency in the cyber mission space, there are no statutes outlining 
jurisdictional boundaries between federal and state agencies. This gap leaves ambiguity 
and the potential for conflict, which strains relationships and hinders communication and 
collaboration. 
2. Immigration Enforcement
Immigration enforcement was once seen as a federal government responsibility, 
with state and local governments having little influence on immigration laws and 
policies, but a rise in migration has forced this dynamic to change.275 In 2015, there were 
over 11 million undocumented immigrants in the United States, which suggests the 
federal government alone did not have the manpower required to enforce immigration 
laws.276 As a result, the federal government asked the states for assistance―something 
many scholars now refer to as immigration federalism―but not all states and cities have 
complied because of fundamental disagreements over the policies being enforced.277  
This controversy over state enforcement of federal immigration laws has led to 
sanctuary cities, jurisdictions that do not detain unauthorized immigrants simply because 
of their immigration status.278 Sanctuary cities maintain that the federal government does 
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not have the authority to mandate that state officials enforce federal laws on behalf of the 
government, as the Supreme Court held in Printz v. United States.279 Therefore, while the 
Supremacy Clause prevents states from enacting laws that conflict with federal 
immigration laws, the 10th Amendment protects the states from being forced to act as 
agents for the federal government.  
However, as demonstrated by President Roosevelt in the New Deal, the Necessary 
and Proper Clause gives the federal government the authority to attach conditions to 
federal grants. As a result, President Donald Trump has threatened to eliminate federal 
grants to sanctuary cities until they agree to enforce immigration laws.280 In sum, the 
current immigration enforcement dispute highlights the importance of clarifying 
jurisdictional boundaries for homeland security matters and illustrates the problems that 
arise when all levels of government fail to formalize these limits. 
From a cyber perspective, this delicate balance between the federal powers and 
states’ rights in immigration enforcement demonstrates the complexities of protecting 
state sovereignty, while maintaining homeland security. Whereas the federal government 
has significant authority to create cyber policies, states have the ability to limit the 
effectiveness of these policies. Therefore, it behooves all levels of government to work 
together on policies and strategies that protect the interests of each partner, to ensure 
efficient and effective implementation. 
3. Emergency Management
For decades, federalism has been a driving force in determining emergency 
management policies and procedures. Following a string of poorly handled disaster 
response efforts in the 1970s, President Jimmy Carter created the Federal Emergency 
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Management Agency (FEMA) to improve federal emergency response in 1979.281 The 
decision formalized the federal government’s role in disaster response, but in 1992 this 
role came into question when Hurricane Andrew hit southern Florida.282 Despite ample 
time to prepare for the storm, it took FEMA five days to arrive with supplies for 
survivors and first responders, which caused a national uproar.283 The failure 
reinvigorated qualms over the proper role for each level of government, a sentiment that 
was reinforced 13 years later when FEMA mismanaged its response efforts to survivors 
of Hurricane Katrina.284 These events shaped current statutes and policies, such as the 
Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act (PKEMRA) and the Robert T. 
Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act), which place state 
and local governments in charge of disaster response, with FEMA providing support 
when necessary.285  
Today, if the federal government believes a significant storm will reach landfall in 
the United States, FEMA coordinates with state and local governments in the target 
region to open communication channels and develop a response plan but remains on 
standby.286 If the storm does hit the United States, FEMA communicates with the 
affected states to maintain situational awareness but does not take action until state and 
local resources are exhausted, and the Governor signs a disaster declaration.287 Once the 
declaration is signed and the president approves federal action, FEMA formally responds 
to the disaster and assists in the response and recovery efforts.288 This process puts state 
and local governments firmly in control of disaster response, leaving the federal 
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government little authority to act until the affected state or states ask for federal 
assistance. 
This is a useful model for the cyber federalism discussion, but it is too early to 
begin incorporating these policies because they rely on state and local governments 
having the capabilities necessary to handle most incidents without federal assistance. 
State and local first-responders have been developing and refining their capabilities for 
centuries, which allows them great autonomy in responding to incidents without federal 
government involvement. Similarly, once a state or local government develops proficient 
cyber capabilities, the entity is in a position to respond to cyber incidents without federal 
government assistance. Therefore, if state and local governments want to protect state 
sovereignty they should strive for the emergency management model by enhancing their 
current cyber capabilities. 
C. APPLYING THE CONSTITUTION TO CYBER FEDERALISM 
While the Constitution and supporting caselaw provide a legal framework for the 
balance of power among all levels of government, conflicting principles and ambiguity 
make it difficult to develop comprehensive cyber federalism policies. Since cybersecurity 
is still in its infancy as a homeland security mission, policymakers should study examples 
from other homeland security mission spaces for lessons learned and best practices. 
Therefore, this section analyzes how the homeland security missions outlined in the 
previous section apply the legal principles that underpin federalism and highlight 
concepts that can be applied to cyber federalism. 
The first overarching lesson policymakers can learn from counterterrorism, 
immigration enforcement, and emergency management is that clear policies outlining 
jurisdictional boundaries improve efficiency and limit conflict. While federal and state 
governments have clearly defined authority in counterterrorism and emergency response, 
the federal government struggles to enforce immigration laws because it cannot come to 
an agreement with state and local governments on the proper role for each level of 
government. Therefore, formalizing cyber authorities for all levels of government would 
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strengthen the nation’s ability to protect against and respond to cyber incidents as a 
cohesive unit.   
The second lesson policymakers should take away from the other missions is that 
a bottom-up approach to homeland security is often more efficient and effective that a 
top-down approach. A bottom-up approach, whereby state and local governments lead 
efforts with support from the federal government, is often the most effective approach 
because state and local governments become force multipliers for a national strategy 
instead of barriers to a federal strategy. Many homeland security threats are too large for 
the federal government to handle alone; thus, using state and local resources makes these 
problems more manageable. However, the bottom-up approach requires a unified effort 
wherein federal, state, and local governments agree on strategies and desirable outcomes. 
Therefore, it is important for the federal government to work with state and local 
governments to determine the best policies for all partners. 
A third lesson for cyber policymakers is that policies aimed at empowering state 
and local governments to handle homeland security issues within their jurisdictions only 
succeed if these governments have the required capabilities. For example, current federal 
emergency management policies work only because state and local governments have 
invested the time and resources necessary to build disaster response and mitigation 
capabilities. If these governments had no trained first-responders—such as law 
enforcement, firefighters, and emergency management services—policies empowering 
localized response would not be feasible. Therefore, the federal government should focus 
on putting state and local governments in a position to succeed in the cyber mission by 
providing appropriate support through money and technical expertise.  
D. CONCLUSION 
Overall, the federal government plays a critical role in cyber preparedness and 
cyber incident response, but the cyber threat environment has become too large and 
complex to handle alone. Instead, the nation should utilize existing legal frameworks to 
empower state and local governments to play a greater role in cybersecurity. Increasing 
the role of state and local governments would allow the federal government to focus on 
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large-scale threats and cyber information sharing among levels of government. Lessons 
learned from other homeland security missions illustrate that cyber federalism requires 
clearly articulated roles, improved collaboration, and increased resources to build state 
and local government cyber capabilities. Chapter V builds on these principles and 
outlines recommendations for improving cyber preparedness and incident response 
through cyber federalism. The remainder of this thesis identifies ways to improve the 
nation’s cybersecurity posture while adhering to existing legal frameworks and homeland 
security best practices. 
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
As the nation becomes increasingly reliant on complex, interconnected 
information systems, the cyber risk environment expands. While the federal government 
should play an important role in cybersecurity, state and local governments should take 
more responsibility in protecting against and responding to cyber incidents. Chapter IV 
provided a framework for this approach by identifying three factors that are critical to 
federalism in other homeland security missions: (1) clearly articulating roles and 
responsibilities across all levels of government; (2) collaborating among all levels of 
government to ensure mission alignment and efficient use of resources; and (3) 
empowering state and local governments to handle homeland security issues through 
capability development. This chapter uses these guiding principles from other homeland 
security missions to craft recommendations for improving the nation’s cybersecurity 
through cyber federalism. 
A. RECOMMENDATION 1: IMPROVE THE LEGAL FRAMEWORKS AND 
JURISDICTIONAL BOUNDARIES 
Cyber federalism rests on all levels of government understanding their roles in 
cyber preparedness and cyber incident response, but these roles are not clearly defined. 
Currently, one of the main factors that determines what government entity responds to a 
cyber incident is simply which one hears about it first. While the federal government is 
looking to eliminate this problem by improving federal processes through PPD-41, the 
directive does not address coordination between the federal government and state 
governments.289 Therefore, the continued growth of national cyber preparedness requires 
formal policies, a process describing the authorities of each level of government during 
cyber incidents, and a plan to ensure each level of government has the cyber capabilities 
needed to exercise their authority. 
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1. Recommendation 1.1: Clarify Cyber Incident Responsibilities within
State and Local Governments
Cyber incident response is a multifaceted process that sometimes requires parallel 
efforts from organizations with independent objectives. PPD-41 separates these missions 
into three distinct categories: threat response, asset response, and intelligence support.290 
The directive defines threat response as “conducting appropriate law enforcement and 
national security investigative activity at the affected entity’s site” and defines asset 
response as “furnishing technical assistance to affected entities to protect their assets, 
mitigate vulnerabilities, and reduce impacts of cyber incidents.”291 Intelligence support 
aims to improve situational awareness by coordinating information sharing and providing 
an integrated analysis of the cyber threat.292  
It is important to clarify these distinctions because it minimizes confusion and 
improves efficiency during cyber incident response. For example, at the federal level, 
threat response is managed by the FBI because it is the lead federal law-enforcement 
agency while asset response is controlled by DHS because it leads cyber-related technical 
assistance efforts for the federal government.293 The Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence (ODNI) leads intelligence support activities because it is responsible for 
synchronizing and synthesizing intelligence across the federal government.294 As a result, 
when the federal government responds to a cyber incident, each organization understands 
their role, which strengthens the effectiveness of their response. States should also clarify 
the roles and responsibilities of their agencies during a cyber incident to ensure a 







2. Recommendation 1.2: Formalize Cyber Roles and Responsibilities
between Levels of Government
PPD-41 is an important step toward improving the nation’s cybersecurity because 
it details how the federal government responds to a cyber incident and which 
organizations have decision-making authority, but the federal government has not 
outlined how these responsibilities are shared with other levels of government.295
Therefore, Congress should formalize jurisdictional boundaries between levels of 
government and create a uniform cybercrime code that ensures consistency regardless of 
which entity handles a cyber incident. 
Under the CFAA, the federal government may only prosecute cybercrimes if there 
is a “compelling federal interest,” but this standard is ambiguous because the 
interconnectivity of cyber makes nearly all cybercrimes interstate in nature.296 Therefore, 
Congress must clarify these boundaries to ensure consistency and minimize redundancy. 
PPD-41’s Cyber Incident Severity Schema provides a blueprint for a new standard by 
outlining the key elements for evaluating a cyber incident.297 These elements are “(1) the 
severity of the incident; (2) the urgency required for responding to a given incident; (3) 
the seniority level necessary for coordinating response efforts; and (4) the level of 
investment required of response efforts.”298 After analyzing each of these elements, 
government entities can determine the scope of the incident, the resources required to 
address the problem, and which organization is best equipped to handle the incident 
based on capabilities and applicable laws.299  
Under the PPD-41 framework, if an incident has all of these elements, it may rise 
to the level of a significant cyber incident.300 A significant cyber incident is any “cyber 
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incident that is (or group of related cyber incidents that together are) likely to result in 
demonstrable harm to the national security interests, foreign relations, or economy of 
the United States or to the public confidence, civil liberties, or public health and safety 
of the American people.”301 Based on lessons learned from other homeland security 
missions, multi-government incident management works best when the federal 
government focuses on the most complex and resource-intensive issues while state and 
local governments handle smaller threats. Therefore, the federal government should play 
a leading role in responding to significant cyber incidents because these are the incidents 
that are most likely to affect multiple states or impact national security.  
On the other hand, states should have the lead role in cyber incidents that do not 
rise to the level of a significant cyber incident because they are responsible for protecting 
their citizens, and the Constitution empowers them to enforce their own laws.302
Furthermore, each jurisdiction should prosecute cybercrimes within their territory unless 
the crime is part of a significant cyber incident. Since cybercrimes are borderless and 
malicious actors may live anywhere, prosecutorial jurisdiction should be determined by 
where the victim or breached system resides. If a cyber incident results in multiple 
victims living in multiple states, the federal government and the states should have 
concurrent jurisdiction. In other words, the federal government may choose to intervene, 
but each state should reserve the right to prosecute the malicious actors for crimes 
committed against victims in their jurisdiction. In all cases, all levels of government 
should be ready to provide incident support, even if they do not have a command role. 
Another variable in determining the roles of each level of government during a 
cyber incident is the nexus to foreign actors. Many cyber-attacks originate from overseas, 
which complicates jurisdictional considerations because even a minor cyber incident may 
require federal government involvement. Article II of the Constitution grants the federal 
government authority to represent the nation in matters of foreign affairs so the federal 
government is best positioned to address these issues through diplomatic channels. 
Therefore, for legal and political reasons, the federal government should retain authority 
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to prosecute foreign actors, especially if those actors were working on behalf of a foreign 
government.303  
Admittedly, having the federal government lead all cyber cases with a foreign 
nexus increases the likelihood that minor cybercrimes, like Nigerian phishing scams, go 
unpunished, but the resources required to prosecute these crimes are immense, and the 
probabilities of tracking down each scammer are low. Instead, the federal government 
should work with other levels of government and other countries to increase public 
awareness of these scams and to ensure these countries are prosecuting their citizens for 
these crimes. While these steps will not prevent all cyber-attacks from foreign actors, 
they will decrease the likelihood of these attacks being successful and make future 
attacks less appealing for criminals. 
3. Recommendation 1.3: Strengthen Cybercrime Prosecution by
Standardizing Cyber Laws
One of the first steps for improving consistency in cyber incident response is 
developing comprehensive cybercrime legislation that standardizes how these crimes are 
defined and enforced. Currently, states statutes expressly prohibit certain cybercrimes, 
while other cybercrimes are not expressly prohibited so they are prosecuted through 
traditional criminal laws.304 For example, only California and Wyoming have legislation 
that addresses ransomware while all other states use existing extortion or computer 
trespass laws to prosecute these offenders.305 The deficiencies in cybercrime legislation 
makes it difficult to clarify jurisdictional boundaries because each entity defines and 
punishes the crime differently. Therefore, increased uniformity in cybercrime laws would 
stabilize these boundaries. 
These uniform standards must incorporate basic criminal law principles—that is, 
the intent of the actor (mens rea), the act committed (actus reus), and harm to the victim 
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(causation)—to classify cybercrimes. Mens rea is important because the law should only 
punish those intending to cause harm, not those who cause harm by accident. Actus reus 
is also important because a guilty mind should only be punished if the person follows 
through on those thoughts. Finally, causation is critical because the government must 
show that the actions caused the intended harm, or a reasonable person could have 
expected that these actions would cause harm. 
Once states have cybercrimes clearly defined in their penal codes, the nation must 
agree on standardized cybercrime classifications, such as a minimum standard for 
misdemeanor cybercrimes and felony cybercrimes. In the CFAA, a cybercrime rises to 
the level of a felony if the value of damage exceeds $5,000, but it can be difficult to 
measure the financial harm of some cybercrimes.306 For example, this threshold does not 
account for cybercrimes with psychological or emotional harm, such as cyberstalking or 
cyberbullying, because these crimes do not have intrinsic dollar values. Therefore, any 
comprehensive penal code for cybercrimes must account for cybercrime’s evolution since 
the CFAA was enacted in 1986.307 
Instead of basing cybercrime classifications solely on fiscal damage, a 
comprehensive penal code for cybercrimes should punish cybercrimes based on the 
totality of the consequences, which include profits accrued as well as digital, physical, or 
psychological damage caused by the crime. A uniform cybercrime standard should also 
ensure that malicious actors are punished in proportion to the consequences of their 
crimes. For example, it would be a misdemeanor for an individual to access a computer 
intentionally without authorization even if the assailant caused no damage and did not 
profit from the data on the computer. However, it would be a felony if the malicious actor 
stole proprietary data from the computer and sold the information to a third party for 
$500,000. Similarly, it might be a felony if the malicious actor stole embarrassing photos 
from the computer and used these photos to cause serious, irreparable psychological 
harm. Overall, the precise threshold for when a misdemeanor becomes a felony must be 
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left up to each individual state in accordance with the 10th Amendment, but each state 
should adhere to the same basic principles of proportionality in their sentencing.  
In some cases, if a cybercrime causes enough damage, such as loss of life, a 
proportional sentence may be capital punishment. For example, if a ransomware attack on 
a hospital prevents patients from receiving appropriate medical care and a patient dies 
because of this delay in treatment, the attack should be seen as homicide and the 
perpetrator should be punished in accordance with the homicide laws of that jurisdiction. 
The CFAA states, “If the offender attempts to cause or knowingly or recklessly causes 
death,” the maximum sentence is life imprisonment.308 The United Kingdom can also 
sentence criminals to life in prison if their cyber-attack causes death.309 However, some 
countries, such as Nigeria, have increased the maximum sentence for certain cybercrimes 
to capital punishment if the cyber-attack is deadly.310 While capital punishment laws 
differ from state to state, all levels of government should examine current cybercrime 
sentences and ensure that these punishments fit the crime, especially for felony 
cybercrimes in which the cyber-attack results in death.    
On the other end of the spectrum, some cybercrimes appear to be a mere public 
nuisance that cause minimal damage, such as spam emails, but even these crimes can 
cause harm to consumers and companies.311 For example, a spam email may expose 
consumers—including underage consumers—to inappropriate or offensive content and 
may contain links that upload malware onto a user’s system, which can cause harm to a 
computer and the user. Additionally, spam emails monopolize bandwidth at the expense 
of Internet service providers and email services, which increases costs and limits 
processing power.312 Therefore, these unsolicited emails should be controlled and the 
308 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S. Code 47 § 1030 (c)(4)(F). 
309 Thomas Fox-Brewster, “UK Introduced Life Sentences for Killer Hackers This Month. In Nigeria, 








malicious actors should be held accountable. These minor offenses should be considered 
misdemeanor cybercrimes and regulated through heavy fines, much like unsolicited 
telemarketer phone calls.313  
If the United States wants to lower the frequency and severity of cybercrimes, it 
must create a legal framework that enables prosecutors to pursue justice for all kinds of 
cybercrimes, whether minor or severe. It would be impossible to legislate each kind of 
cybercrime and their consequences; therefore, the nation needs a penal structure that is 
flexible enough to incorporate all cybercrimes yet precise enough to enforce. Table 1 
creates the confines for this structure by grouping all cybercrimes into two major 
categories, misdemeanors and felonies, and describing the kinds of cybercrimes that fit 
into these categories. Felonies are further broken down to highlight the crimes that are 
serious enough to be considered a capital offense.  
Table 1.   Proposed Cybercrimes Classifications and Sentencing Guidelines. 
Classification Crime Committed Punishment 
Felony 
A and B 
Serious offenses resulting in 
death or serious bodily injury, 
including but not limited to 
• Large-scale attack on power
grid 
• Hate crimes
Minimum of 25 years to life in 
prison, including death penalty. 
Up to a $250,000 fine. 
C, D, and E 
Serious offenses, including but 
not limited to 
• Computer fraud
• Child pornography
One year to 25 years in prison. 
Up to a $250,000 fine. 
Misdemeanor 
Minor offenses, including but 




Less than one year in prison. 
Up to a $100,000 fine. 
The table summarizes what constitutes a misdemeanor and felony, including 
capital offenses, based on the recommendations outlined in this section and the United 
313 “The Telemarketing Sales Rule,” Federal Trade Commission, accessed November 4, 2017, 
https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0198-telemarketing-sales-rule. 
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States Penal Code.314 Notably, the specific crimes listed may require a higher 
classification if the physical, financial, or psychological damage warrants a more severe 
punishment. Overall, the chart is designed to provide a framework for future discussions 
and to help legislators understand how cybercrimes fit within current sentencing 
structures.   
Moving forward, all levels of government must strengthen their cybercrime laws 
and clearly define cybercrime classifications. Additionally, the federal government must 
simplify the “compelling federal interest” standard by reserving the right to prosecute all 
crimes that violate federal statutes, but focusing resources on serious felonies that stem 
from a significant cyber incident.315 On the other hand, states should retain authority to 
prosecute all misdemeanor crimes and felony acts that do not violate federal law or the 
federal government chooses not to pursue. By empowering the states with this authority, 
it allows the federal government to focus on the most serious and complex cases while 
also ensuring the integrity of the cyber federalism construct. It also encourages states to 
improve their cybercrime statutes and allows them to protect their citizens with the laws 
that best fit the needs of their jurisdiction. 
B. RECOMMENDATION 2: INCREASE CYBER INVESTMENTS AND 
MAXIMIZE EXISTING RESOURCES 
While the number of cyber incidents continues to grow each year, state and local 
governments rarely make cybersecurity a funding priority.316 In 2015, the Ponemon 
Institute estimated that half of state and local governments experienced six to 25 cyber-
attacks in the previous 24 months, but most state budgets allocate less than two-percent 
of their information security funding on cybersecurity.317 If state and local governments 
are serious about securing their digital infrastructure from a growing cyber threat, they 
need to increase their cybersecurity investments and maximize existing resources. 
314 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, 18 U.S. Code 227 § 3559. 
315 “Prosecuting Computer Crimes.” 




1. Recommendation 2.1: Prioritize Cybersecurity in Future Budgets and
Create a Federal Cyber Grant Program
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, foreign-born terrorism has 
attributed for roughly six deaths in America each year and the United States has spent 
over $100 billion per year to deter or disrupt acts of terrorism during that timeframe.318
While some may argue that the money spent on counterterrorism is the reason for the 
small number of terrorism-related deaths each year, the dollar amount speaks to the larger 
issue of prioritization. Over 80 percent of state CIOs believe that a lack of funding is their 
number one barrier to addressing cybersecurity gaps, which suggests that even when state 
and local governments have the money to spend on security, they do not invest these 
resources in cybersecurity.319 Moving forward, states must reevaluate this strategy 
because recent cyber-attacks to critical infrastructure, such as power grids and election 
systems, and other public services demonstrate the potential impacts of future incidents 
and highlight the importance of making cybersecurity a priority.320  
Federal preparedness grant programs also need to make cybersecurity a priority. 
From 2011 to 2014, FEMA’s HSGP program awarded states over four-billion dollars to 
address capability gaps, but states spent a total of $27.3 million on cybersecurity.321 In 
fiscal year 2016 alone, FEMA awarded state and local governments $1,617,000,000 to 
build capabilities in terrorism prevention, port security, and various forms of transit 
security, but none of this funding was specifically allocated for cybersecurity.322 While 
cybersecurity is an “allowable expense” under the HSGP, there are no specific grants for 
318 Dave Mosher and Skye Gould, “How Likely are Foreign Terrorists to Kill Americans? The Odds 
May Surprise You,” Business Insider, January 31, 2017, http://www.businessinsider.com/death-risk-
statistics-terrorism-disease-accidents-2017-1. 
319 2016 Deloitte-NASCIO Cybersecurity Study. 
320 Ellen Nakashima, “Russia has Developed a Cyberweapon that can Disrupt Power Grids, According 
to New Research,” Washington Post, June 12, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/russia-has-developed-a-cyber-weapon-that-can-disrupt-power-grids-according-to-new-
research/2017/06/11/b91b773e-4eed-11e7-91eb-9611861a988f_story.html?utm_term=.443461daea9c. 
321 Garcia, “A Look at State and Local Cybersecurity Funding.” 
322 “Grant Program Directorate Information Bulletin No. 411a.” 
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cybersecurity, which means states do not have to spend their grant money on improving 
their cybersecurity.323  
Conversely, Section 2006 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 requires states to 
spend at least 25 percent of HSGP funds on terrorism prevention activities.324 In 
addition, last year FEMA awarded $10 million in Countering Violent Extremism grants, 
$10 million in tribal grants to prevent terrorism and $39 million in Complex Coordinated 
Attack grants.325 Simply put, the disparity between counterterrorism grant funding and 
cybersecurity grant funding is a problem. 
Recently, Representative Derek Kilmer of Washington introduced a bill, entitled 
the State Cyber Resiliency Act, which addresses this problem by creating a preparedness 
grant program specifically for cybersecurity.326 The program would provide funding to 
states so they can develop their cyber capabilities by adopting cybersecurity best 
practices, addressing cyber workforce gaps, improving digital infrastructure, and 
establishing scholarships and apprenticeships to improve cyber education.327 This 
program would be a significant step for the nation as it works together to improve cyber 
resiliency across all levels of government. 
2. Recommendation 2.2: Enhance Threat Detection and Indicator
Sharing through State-led Cyber Operation Centers and/or by
Expanding the Roles and Capabilities of Fusion Centers
Cyber information sharing can be resource intensive as it requires money and 
personnel to gather, verify and share information with counterparts across the field.328
However, if managed properly, the long-term benefits outweigh initial costs and 
323 Garcia, “A Look at State and Local Cybersecurity Funding.” 
324 Ibid. 
325 Ibid. 
326 “H.R. 1344 – State Cyber Resiliency Act,” Congress, accessed November 4, 2017, 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/1344. 
327 Ibid. 
328 Chris Johnson, Lee Badger, David Waltermire, Julie Snyder, Clem Skorupka, “Guide to Cyber 
Threat Information Sharing,” NIST Special Publication, October 2016, page 5, 
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-150.pdf. 
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minimize future costs because the information allows partners to have greater 
understanding of their threats and to be more efficient in addressing these threats.329
Therefore, each state and large municipality should have at least one cyber operations 
center that allows them to share information across their state and with other information 
sharing hubs across the nation.  
States should also look to repurpose, or expand the mission requirements of, 
existing operation centers that have the infrastructure for information sharing. For 
example, fusion centers were designed to facilitate information sharing on terrorism, but 
some fusion centers are expanding their mission to include cyber threat information 
sharing.330 This allows states to utilize existing resources to address cybersecurity 
without wasting time and money on new facilities and new equipment. Therefore, each 
state should look to expand the role of their fusion centers to include cyber threat 
information sharing, thereby utilizing existing resources, processes, and relationships of 
fusion centers to streamline cyber threat information sharing initiatives. 
3. Recommendation 2.3: Create an Agile Cyber Workforce with the
Ability to Expand during a Cyber Incident
Given the difficulties that state and local governments have in developing their 
cyber workforce, it is unrealistic to assume they will have the personnel needed to 
respond to all incidents. Instead, states need a scalable workforce that is able to handle 
day-to-day cybersecurity but also able to expand quickly if a cyber incident overwhelms 
local personnel. Therefore, states should develop a cyber reservist cadre that activates 
during large cyber incidents to support local response teams. These cyber reservists can 
be from the National Guard or even volunteer cyber responders, much like the volunteer 
firefighters that many jurisdictions use around the country.  
329 Ibid. 
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State and local entities should also explore opportunities for mutual aid 
agreements with other jurisdictions because it allows organizations to address capability 
gaps without investing new resources. In fact, cyber’s global reach strengthens the utility 
of mutual aid agreements because state and local governments are not limited to 
bordering territories. Governments can enter into agreements with any jurisdiction in the 
country, which means the opportunities for collaboration are limitless. Therefore, state 
and local governments should work together and share resources, especially in an 
environment where the threat is growing and resources are scarce. 
4. Recommendation 2.4: Create “Cyber 9-1-1” to Centralize Cyber
Incident Reporting
If state and local governments are going to take a larger role in the cybersecurity 
mission, there must be greater consistency in how they handle cyber incidents and how 
victims notify the government of cyber incidents. The federal government has simplified 
cyber incident reporting by implementing a “just tell someone” policy where victims can 
contact any federal agency with cyber responsibilities and putting the burden on the 
agencies to determine jurisdiction.331 This makes it easier for victims to inform the 
federal government of ongoing attacks and prevents them from wasting time trying to 
search for the proper federal agency to contact, which gives incident responders more 
time to address the threat and mitigate consequences. 
States should take this one step further by developing their own “Cyber 9-1-1” 
reporting tool that allows victims to call or email one central location that assesses reports 
and routes each report accordingly. This would help government entities coordinate their 
response efforts and make it easier for victims to know who to contact during a cyber 
emergency. Additionally, states should look for ways to automate assessments of incident 
reports to maximize efficiency and preserve resources. 
331 “Cyber Incident Reporting: A Unified Message for Reporting to the Federal Government,” DHS, 




C. RECOMMENDATION 3: EMPHASIZE CYBER EDUCATION AND 
COLLABORATION AMONG THE PUBLIC SECTOR, PRIVATE 
SECTOR, AND ACADEMIA 
As the cyber workforce gap expands, it amplifies the need for a multilayered 
cyber education and training strategy at the state and local level. These governments need 
to work with schools and universities to develop a cyber education pathway that begins in 
grade schools and continues into high schools and colleges as required courses for 
graduation. High schools and colleges should identify gifted students and place them in 
advanced programs to nurture their talents, much like the advanced trainings offered to 
promising young athletes and musicians. This strategy would help develop the current 
workforce, but also position the nation for growing cyber demands in the future. 
1. Recommendation 3.1: Incorporate Cyber Education in School
Curriculums for Children of All Ages
According to the nonprofit organization Change the Equation, 22 percent of 12th 
graders in the United States have taken at least one computer programming class in their 
life.332 Moreover, less than half of the 12th graders in the United States have access to a 
computer science class.333 These are troublesome statistics, but state and local 
governments are in the best position to alter these trends because they set the guidelines 
for grade school and high school curriculums.  
Moving forward, the Department of Education should encourage schools to 
incorporate cybersecurity classes in middle school and high school curriculums, and 
develop grant programs to ensure that schools have the resources to offer these classes. 
State and local governments should explore ways to increase the number of cybersecurity 
and computer science classes for middle school and high school students, and consider 
mandating these classes as part of statewide curriculums. Schools should also explore 
aligning cybersecurity and computer science classes with their language departments so 
children have the option to take these classes in lieu of traditional language classes, such 




as Spanish or Latin. Additionally, states should work with their National Guard and 
federal government counterparts to bring cyber experts into classrooms for specialized 
training and recruiting, especially in underprivileged areas where resources make it more 
difficult to identify and cultivate talented students. 
2. Recommendation 3.2: Place Greater Emphasis on Computer Science
Programs in Universities
As described in Chapter III, some states are working to improve cyber education 
and training at the college level, but few college curriculums are adapting to the growing 
needs.334 A recent survey of the top computer science programs in the United States 
found that none of the top 10 universities require a cybersecurity course to graduate and 
only three in the top 50 require at least one cybersecurity course.335 This suggests that the 
nation’s universities do not see cybersecurity as a priority class and have not yet 
developed the programmatic infrastructure needed to improve cyber education. 
Moving forward, universities must look to offer more computer science classes, 
but particularly cybersecurity classes, and explore ways to incorporate cybersecurity 
education in non-computer science degree programs as cybersecurity should be integrated 
into every field of study. State and local governments should expand their scholarship 
and grant programs for cybersecurity studies, particularly for students that agree to work 
for in the public sector after they graduate. 
3. Recommendation 3.3: Develop Technology Parks that Bring the
Public Sector, Private Sector, and Academia to a Central Location
One of the best examples of integrating leaders in technology from the public 
sector, the private sector, and academia is Stanford’s relationship with its neighbors in 
Silicon Valley. Silicon Valley is widely seen as a world leader in technology and many of 
their most notable residents—such as the leaders for Hewlett-Packard, Google, and 





Yahoo—come from Stanford.336 In fact, over 50 percent of Silicon Valley’s products 
come from Stanford alumni.337   
Other countries, such as Israel, are trying to recreate Silicon Valley’s relationship 
with Stanford by creating technology parks, such as the Advanced Technology Park and 
CyberSpark, which co-locate members of the cyber community to maximize resources 
and simplify collaboration.338 These parks offer state-of-the-art cyber facilities that allow 
the cyber community to train, educate, research, and develop together with the best 
equipment and the brightest cyber minds.339 This proactive approach to cross-sector 
collaboration has been very successful as Israel owns one of the stronger cyber armies in 
the world and their cybersecurity firms own roughly 10 percent of an $11.9 billion global 
cyber market.340  
Moving forward, state and local governments should strive to recreate Stanford’s 
symbiotic relationship with Silicon Valley by incentivizing collaboration through 
technology parks or similar programs. These programs provide research facilities for 
local universities, government entities, and the private sector to explore and innovate in a 
collaborative environment. Increased collaboration would not only improve relationships 
in the community and promote innovation, but also incentivize companies from around 
the world to come to their state, which would create new jobs and new opportunities for 
economic growth. 
D. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, America’s infrastructure relies on interconnected and 
interdependent information systems, which fuel productivity, efficiency and prosperity, 
336 “History of Stanford,” Stanford University, accessed November 4, 2017, 
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but also creates a cyber threat environment that is too complex for the federal government 
to handle alone. The federal government is a driving force in national security, but state 
and local governments must play a critical role in cybersecurity by developing the cyber 
capabilities necessary to protect against and respond to cyber incidents. After all, while 
the United States has evolved from 13 loosely organized states into the most powerful 
nation in the world, its federalist roots remain a defining element of its governing 
structure and as the nation progresses through the digital age, these ideals must extend 
into the cyber realm. 
State and local governments may be best positioned to handle many cyber 
incidents, but many of these entities do not have the policies, resources, and capabilities 
required to protect against and respond to cyber incidents. Therefore, the nation should 
focus on strengthening state and local cyber capabilities so these entities can address 
localized threats, thereby allowing the federal government to focus its resources on large-
scale information sharing, significant cyber incidents, and international matters. The 
nation must also clarify jurisdictional boundaries between all levels of government and 
improve legal standards so laws are enforced consistently across the country. Table 2 
outlines the three recommendations for improving cyber federalism and the tasks for 
implementing these recommendations. 
Table 2.   Overview of Recommendations. 
Recommendations Steps for Implementation 
Improve the legal frameworks that shape 
cybersecurity by formalizing jurisdictional 
boundaries and standardizing cybercrime 
laws. 
Clarify cyber incident responsibilities 
within state and local governments 
Formalize cyber roles and responsibilities 
between levels of government. 
Standardize cybercrime statutes. 
Strengthen state and local cyber incident 
response capabilities by increasing financial 
investments and maximizing existing 
resources. 
Prioritize cybersecurity spending. 
Enhance state-led cyber operation centers. 
Create a malleable cyber workforce. 
Create “Cyber 9-1-1.” 
Expand cyber workforce by increasing 
emphasis on cyber education and 
collaboration between the public sector, 
private sector, and academia. 
Improve cyber education. 
Emphasize computer science programs. 
Develop technology parks. 
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If the nation wants to maintain its reputation as a world leader in the cyber 
community and improve its cyber posture, it must embrace a bottom-up approach that 
empowers state and local governments to play a larger role in cybersecurity. Cyber 
federalism would make the nation more adaptable and dynamic when protecting against 
rapidly evolving cyber threats, which would improve cybersecurity for the nation as a 
whole. Overall, the key to success against America’s newest threat lies in one of its oldest 
traditions so it is time for the nation to embrace its past as it prepares for the future. 
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APPENDIX.  CYBER INCIDENT SEVERITY SCHEMA 
In 2016, President Barack Obama released Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) 
41: United States Cyber Incident Coordination, to improve cyber incident response 
coordination within the federal government.341 Alongside PPD-41, President Obama 
released the Cyber Incident Severity Schema, which provides a rubric for analyzing cyber 
incidents and determining the proper level of federal response.342 Table 3 recreates the 
Cyber Incident Severity Schema, including the colors associated with each level. It also 
demarcates the threshold where a cyber incident rises to significant cyber incident.343   
Table 3.   PPD-41 Cyber Incident Severity Schema. 







Poses an imminent threat to the provision of wide-scale 
critical infrastructure services, national gov’t stability, or to 




Likely to result in a significant impact to public health or 
safety, national security, economic security, foreign relations, 




Likely to result in a demonstrable impact to public health or 
safety, national security, economic security, foreign relations, 






May impact public health or safety, national security, 





Unlikely to impact public health or safety, national security, 
economic security, foreign relations, civil liberties, or public 
confidence. 
Level 0 Unsubstantiated or inconsequential event. 
341 Obama, “Presidential Policy Directive – United States Cyber Incident Coordination.” 
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